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At one time or another, each of us has desperately craved
something. While we often indulge such cravings, every now 
and then we show self-restraint. The source of our self-
control is not always the same. Sometimes it seems to come
from within. Other times, however, it is clear that something 
in our environment has snapped us out of the haze of desire.
Maybe it was the beauty of the sunset. Or the calorie count
on the menu. Or the wedding ring on a finger. Or the sign
stating, “public nudity is a punishable offense.”  
There is no limit on the kinds of things that can serve
this external constraining function, but some are likely better 
at it than others. Even in this short list, we might guess that
the law is a better constraint than the sunset. The reason is
obvious: to those subject to it, the nudity law states a clear 
obligatory command backed up with official sanctions.
Indeed, the primary appeal of law might be its ability to
modify our decisionmaking through these hard measures, 
thereby leading us to behave better.
Of course, we conceive of some utterances as laws despite 
the fact that they do not use hard measures. The statute in
† Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; S.J.D., Harvard Law 
School. The author wishes to thank David Enoch, Chris Essert, Steve Galoob,
Rachel Godsil, Solangel Maldonado, David Opderbeck, Jon Romberg, Lewis
Sargentich, Dan Simon, Matthew Stephenson, Simon Stern, Charles Sullivan,































   
   







788 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
North Carolina that names the gray squirrel as the official 
state mammal1 does not on a straightforward reading appear 
to create any new obligations; rather, it serves primarily to
proclaim the legislature’s love of squirrels. Yet we still think
of that statute as a law. While the squirrel statute is an easy
example to spot, it is not always obvious that legislation has
such modest ambitions. It took the United States Supreme 
Court to establish that Section 6010 of the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act2 was designed
merely “to encourage, rather than mandate, the provision of
better services to the developmentally disabled[,]”3 even
though the statute stated that “[t]he Federal Government
and the States both have an obligation”4 to prevent spending 
on institutions that do not meet minimum standards for the
care of the disabled. Yet, despite its interpretation of the Act,
the Supreme Court nevertheless referred to the Act as a
“law.”5 
Thus, norms can possess many of the trappings of law
but fail to have the features that we believe are necessary to
create constraining obligations on those who are subject to
them.6 Such norms are popularly known as “soft law.” A law
can be soft because it is stated in such an indeterminate 
manner that it is impossible to identify a specific obligation
within it.7 Even when a law states clear obligations, it can be 
soft because it appears merely to duplicate obligations that 
already exist.8 Still other times, it can be soft because it
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 145-5 (2013) (“The gray squirrel (Sciurus carolinensis) is
hereby adopted as the official State mammal of the State of North Carolina.”).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15009 (2011)).
3. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1981).
 4. § 6010(3).
 5. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 31 (“Congress in recent years has enacted several
laws designed to improve the way in which this Nation treats the mentally
retarded. The [Act] is one such law.”).
6. This is consistent with the broad, and somewhat unhelpful, first definition 
set forth in BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY: “Collectively, rules that are neither strictly 
binding nor completely lacking in legal significance.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1519 (9th ed. 2009). 
7. See infra Part I.B.2.b.



















   
 





















 789 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
appears that the legislature wrote the law so as not to
constrain anyone at all.9 
The strangeness of soft law has led many to question
whether it makes sense at all. Famously, Prosper Weil 
argued thirty years ago that such instruments “are neither
‘soft law’ nor ‘hard law’: they are simply not law at all.”10 
Since then, a steady stream of scholars has reiterated the 
point. Anthony Clark Arend described soft law as
“oxymoronic” and argued that “[i]f a rule meets the criteria
for law, then it should be called ‘law.’ If, however, the rule is
not binding—as soft law has been described to be—then it 
should not have law anywhere in its name.”11 Others have 
described it as “a misnomer,”12 “incoherent,”13 “illogical,”14 and 
9. See infra Part I.B.1. 
10. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 413, 414-15 n.7 (1983).
 11. ANTHONY CLARK AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 25 
(1999).
 12. Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response
to Awakening Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 
1, 20 (2004) (“Similarly, resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly
generally are not legally binding. Those resolutions are often referred to as ‘soft 
law,’ a misnomer, since they are really not law. Courts should therefore not
impose them on States.”).
 13. Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.  
INT’L. L. 581, 582 (2005) (“First, I argue that the notion of ‘soft law’ agreements is
incoherent. Under the prevailing approach, pledges are being smuggled into the
international lawyer's repertoire by dubbing them soft law. Just as frequently,
scholars declare that contracts containing vague or imprecise commitments are 
actually soft. In so doing, these commentators are conflating the legality of
agreements with structure (in particular, enforcement features) or substance
(e.g., rule precision), or effects with causes (i.e., looking to behavioral effects to
demonstrate international law's existence). Both sets of moves elaborate a
conceptual category—soft law agreements—that has no compelling basis in state
practice or legal theory.”). 
14. BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A  DICTIONARY 25 (2005) (“The
concept of soft law has been criticized as illogical (something is the law or is not),
confusing, misleading, and even dangerous. Critics have charged it with blurring
the distinction between the law in force (de lege lata) and the law in the process
of formation (de lege ferenda) and, more generally, between what is actually
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“incorrect”15 on similar grounds. 
Despite the skepticism about whether it deserves legal 
status, soft law is an increasingly common mode of regulation
for international bodies.16 We might wonder why something
that is so easily dismissed as “inconsequential”17 is such a
popular regulative tool. The attractiveness of soft law, at
least from the perspective of those who have the power to 
enact hard law, has a simple explanation: it is generally
cheaper to make and easier to pass than hard law.18 When 
15. László Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 
59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 605, 610 (2010) (“One part of the problem is thus of
terminological character. Is this worth finding fault? For example, Sztucki is
rather lenient towards the term. Even though he finds it quite incorrect, he 
considers that in indicating or denoting complex phenomena such all-embracing
and indefinite ‘capsule formulas’ may be used. In addition, he says that in
international law there are many imprecise and incorrect expressions, and soft
law can only increase this number at the very best. The real problem, however, is
that the expression is not only incorrect but it is also meaningless . . . . [V]irtually
every non-legal norm may be described [as soft law].”).
 16. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, Enforcement Problems in “Informal” Labor Markets: 
A View from Israel, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 3, 14 n.26 (2005) (“Recently, ‘soft
law’ solutions have become popular. Indeed, voluntary and semi-voluntary 
solutions could be useful alongside traditional, ‘hard law’ enforcement.”); 
Jonathan Graubart, Giving Meaning to New Trade-Linked “Soft Law” Agreements
on Social Values: A Law-in-Action Analysis of NAFTA’s Environmental Site
Agreement, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 425, 427 (2001-02) (“Soft law
agreements have become popular in recent years in the areas of human rights,
labor rights, and environmental standards . . . .”); Minsu Longiaru, The Secondary
Consequences of International Institutions: A Case Study of Mexican Civil Society
Networks and Claims-Making, 37 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 63, 70 (2006) (“‘[S]oft law’
mechanisms are becoming an increasingly popular vehicle for facilitating public
participation in international institutions, especially in the international
environmental arena.”). 
17. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional 
Practice, 61 STAN. L.  REV. 573, 626 (2008) (“When lawmaking authorities create
laws that by their own terms or common understanding have no effect, one 
immediately suspects a cynical public-relations ploy.”).
 18. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423 (2000) [hereinafter Abbott &
Snidal, International Governance] (“Importantly, because one or more of the 
elements of legalization can be relaxed, softer legalization is often easier to
achieve than hard legalization.”); Louis Kaplow, Rule Versus Standards: An 
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 621-22 (1992) (“Determining the
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there is no pressure to state a clear obligation, the legislator’s 
job becomes far easier. Why set forth specific speed limits 
when you can simply state, “drive at a reasonable speed?” 
Obviously, the fact that one can do something cheaply 
does not mean that he or she ought to do it. One can get a 
dozen rotten eggs for a quarter, but this would hardly be
considered an attractive deal. So a question remains: is soft 
law worth it? 
In recent years, analysis of the benefits of soft law has 
become a hot topic.19 Several scholars endorse soft law, but 
when they do, they focus almost exclusively upon the 
beneficial functions that distinguish soft law from hard law.
In particular, they praise the flexibility that it accords those 
who apply or are subject to it. Considering broad legal 
standards (such as that “reasonable” speed limit), some
scholars have praised their ability to advance the systematic 
goals of government in a deliberate, measured, and context-
sensitive way.20 Even if laws start out soft—failing to state a
clear enough obligation to guide conduct—they can evolve
into finely tuned hard norms over time through precedential, 
case-by-case adjudication. Though the content of our speed 
limit started as the arguably indeterminate directive of 
“travel at a reasonable speed,” each time that a court applied
it to a particular set of facts and issued a precedential 
decision, it made the content of the law more specific by
identifying conduct that satisfied or violated the norm.21 
Thus, broadly written soft law can become hard law at a
fraction of the price. It has the capacity to operate as a cost-
most of the expense would be wasted. It would be preferable to wait until
particular circumstances arise.”).
 19. See, e.g., Brian Sheppard, Calculating the Standard Error: Just How Much 
Should Empirical Studies Curb Our Enthusiasm for Legal Standards?, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 92, 92 (2011), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdfs/volume124_forum_sheppard.pdf.
 20. See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 750-52 (2009).
 21. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of

























     





792 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
efficient delegation of legislative labor to the courts.22 Better 
still, the delegation lowers the risk of error, so legislators 
might find it easier to garner the support necessary for the
enactment of soft laws than for hard laws.  
That is hardly the only reason to recommend soft law.
Scholars also claim that soft law is uniquely able to spark 
discussion23 or contemplation24 among those who must apply 
such broad or vague language to concrete situations. Further, 
soft law can provide an early signal of the form that hard law
will eventually take.25 It can even serve as a useful low-stakes 
laboratory, providing a glimpse of how precise norms might 
operate in a hard law environment by exposing the same 
norms to smaller groups of actors or only to those actors that
are interested in opting into the system. Lastly, soft law has
the capacity to increase overall welfare by informing people 
of official preferences without forcing them to suffer any
limitations on their conduct.26 People might draw some 
happiness from the fact that their legislature has enshrined 
an official beverage or named a highway after a popular war
hero, but that happiness would surely be threatened were
those acts to come with the hard law price of obligation, such 
as having to pay a tax on that beverage or a toll on that
bridge.  
22. See Abbott & Snidal, International Governance, supra note 18, at 434 (“A
major advantage of softer forms of legalization is their lower contracting costs.”);
Kaplow, supra note 18, at 621-22.
 23. See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L.  REV. 
577, 607-10 (1988).
 24. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the 
Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1231 (2010). 
25. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 586 (“Congress or another
lawmaking body uses soft law to convey information about future intentions to
enact hard law, allowing people to adjust their behavior in advance of binding
statutes and in some cases avoiding constitutional requirements that apply to
hard law.”).
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Having discussed its many positive qualities,27 we might
now wonder why some are reluctant to bestow upon soft law
legal status. It is important to remember that apologists for
soft law embrace it, not because they believe it can mimic the
constraining power of hard law, but because of the non-
constraining qualities that only soft law possesses. In other 
words, even those who sing soft law’s praises do not generally
go so far as to say that it can constrain people’s behavior 
through perceived obligation like hard law does. Thus, if we
believe that the sine qua non of law is its ability to constrain
people through perceived obligation, then the argument that
soft law is not law remains viable. 
For centuries, a group of leading philosophers known as
positivists28 has believed that, to be law, a norm must be
obligatory.29 On this view, soft law, insofar as it consists only 
of norms that fail to obligate, is undeserving of the “law”
label. Soft law skeptics embrace a strict form of legal 
positivism, one that places firm limits on the kinds of content
that laws can have and that connects to a bold functionalist
concept of legality. 
27. Of course, some dispute whether the benefits of soft law outweigh the costs. 
See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 
39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 891 (1995).
 28. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 81-82 (2005) (“The literature usually labels nonlegal international
agreements ‘soft law.’ We avoid this label because nonlegal agreements are not
binding under international (or any other) law, so it is confusing to call them law, 
soft or otherwise. The dominant positivistic approach to international law views
nonlegal agreements as aberrational or of secondary importance.”); Weil, supra
note 10, at 421.
 29. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 6 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HART, 
CONCEPT] (“The most prominent general feature of law at all times and places is
that its existence means that certain kinds of human conduct are no longer
optional, but in some sense obligatory.”); Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of
Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L.J. 2, 15 (2011) [hereinafter Coleman, Architecture] (“In
the same way as one cannot know something untrue or deceive someone without
getting her to believe a falsehood, a norm cannot be law in the full sense without
succeeding in binding the conscience: primarily by obligating those to whom it is
directed, and secondarily by motivating their compliance with the obligations
thereby incurred. This is the concept of law suitable for jurisprudence.”); see John
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To be clear, soft law skepticism does not commit one to
the view that hard law must always succeed as a constraint.
A lot of ink has been spilled to prove that people will work to
find ways to escape the constraints of law so that they can do
the things that they want to do. Simply put, some will treat
hard laws as if they are soft if doing so serves their desires. 
When judges engage in this behavior, it is called “judicial
activism.”30 The question that I focus upon here concerns
precisely the opposite phenomenon: do people ever treat soft 
law as if it is hard law, constraining themselves from the
things they would want to do in law’s absence? My answer is
yes. 
This insight came unexpectedly. I discovered it,
ironically, in the course of an empirical study of judicial 
activist behavior. Although I will discuss this study in more
detail below,31 I was seeking to understand the conditions
under which judges in a simulated case would be inclined to
work around hard legal rules to reach outcomes that they 
personally preferred.32 I subjected one group of subjects to a 
broad, soft legal standard, expecting that it would fail to
constrain the subjects in that group and, therefore, that the
subjects would choose the outcome that they preferred.33 
Although it was not a focal point of the study, I was privately
surprised that a small but significant number of subjects
were constrained by the soft law, reaching outcomes to which
they had objected in the absence of the law.34 I call these 
constrained legal outliers “Norm Supercompliers.”
In the following Article, I show how soft law skeptics 
deny or severely undervalue the possibility of
Supercompliance because they assume, often tacitly, the
30. See, e.g., Robert Alt, What Exactly Is ‘Judicial Activism’?, FOX NEWS, (June
27, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/06/27/what-exactly-is-judicial-
activism (“[Judicial activism] occurs when judges write subjective policy
preferences into their decisions rather than interpreting the constitutional or
statutory provisions according to the law’s original meaning or plain text.”).
 31. See infra Part IV.
 32. Brian Sheppard & Andrew Moshirnia, For the Sake of Argument: A 
Behavioral Analysis of Whether and How Legal Argument Matters in
Decisionmaking, 40 FLA. ST.  U. L. REV. 537, 559 (2013).
 33. Id. at 563.
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truth of a rigid functionalism derived from a philosophical 
school known as legal positivism. Thus, the ongoing debate 
about whether soft law deserves legal status is not merely
one about labeling; it is also a disagreement about human
conduct. I hope to establish that the controversy surrounding
soft law’s status turns on implicit hunches about the
possibility of constraint under weak norms. It is time to take
stock of what we have learned from the careful study of
decisionmaking under the influence of norms. Doing so can 
change the terms of the debate and can educate legislatures
about the best means to change the behavior of those subject
to their laws. 
In Part I, I describe the current state of the debate
regarding soft law’s legal status. In doing so, I survey the soft
law literature and create a typology of norm softness, one
that allows us to see the various kinds of norms and norm
sources that have received the “soft law” label. With that
groundwork laid, the way is clear in Part II to identify the
most convincing theoretical justification for soft law
skepticism, one that unites all of the forms of softness under 
a theory that explains how softness robs norms of legality. In 
Part III, I introduce the concept of Norm Supercompliance, 
describing its central characteristics. In Part IV, I identify
examples of Supercompliance and related behavior from the 
empirical literature to establish its plausibility. Thereafter, 
in Part V, I describe how Supercompliance allows soft law to 
perform law’s essential service, refuting the functionalist
account that undergirds soft law skepticism. I conclude the
Article with a discussion of the implications of and likely
responses to my analysis.
I. SOFT LAW AS AN OBJECT OF FASCINATION AND 
CONTROVERSY 
There are two implicit conceptual distinctions within the
notion of soft law: one for softness (the distinction between
hard and soft law), and one for legality (the distinction 
between law and non-law). It will be useful to use these 
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A. Contextualizing the Status Problem: The Hard/Soft and 
Law/Non-Law Distinctions 
The status problem for soft law arises out of the fact that
scholars disagree about the independence of the hard/soft 
and law/non-law distinctions. On the one hand, soft law
skeptics believe that falling on the soft side of the dividing 
line in the first distinction always means that a norm falls on
the non-law side in the second. For them, the distinctions are 
intertwined. Soft law believers, on the other hand, assert that 
the two distinctions operate separately—falling on the soft
side of the dividing line might mean that a norm is law, but
further analysis is necessary.
These distinctions bring up two important points. 
Challenging soft law skepticism does not require one to
articulate an alternative concept of legality; rather, one need 
only show that the skeptic’s understanding of that concept
fails on its own terms. Nor does it mean that a successful 
challenge inevitably leads to naïve formalism—the extreme 
opposite of skepticism—whereby all norms that fall on the 
soft side of the first distinction necessarily fall on the legal 
side of the second. One can refute the argument that all soft 
norms are non-legal without accepting that all soft norms are 
legal.  
To lay the groundwork for a critique of soft law
skepticism, it is necessary to describe in detail the skeptics’ 
account of how softness robs norms of their ability to be laws.
To do this, I will link norm softness to the concept of legality, 
itself. Unified under a single rigorous concept, soft law 
skepticism will be on solid theoretical footing, which will, I
hope, provide some defense against the criticism that I have
not put its best foot forward. Further, it will make it easier
to understand how their functionalist understanding of 
legality rests on a series of behavioral assumptions, which 
can be subjected to empirical testing. 
Trouble arises from the fact that the scholars who discuss 
soft law most profoundly—public international law
scholars—do not typically spend much time on the concept of
law, itself. Moreover, those who discuss the concept of law 
most thoroughly—analytic legal scholars—tend to be largely
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not so hopeless as it may at first seem; it turns out that the
very same notions of obligation that undergird the concept of 
norm softness are elaborated and refined by a leading camp
within analytic legal philosophy known as exclusive legal
positivists. The first step is to list the qualities that render a 
norm soft. 
B. The Features of Soft Law 
Scholars have affixed the “soft law” label to a wide
variety of normative phenomena.35 Considering public 
international regulation, scholars have applied it to United
Nations initiatives, such as the 1974 Charter on Economic 
Rights and Duties,36 the Convention on the Law of the Sea,37 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,38 the 2007
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,39 the 
Helsinki Final Act,40 the Basel Accords,41 the Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights,42 and the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,43 
among others. In the domestic arena, scholars have
35. Abbott & Snidal, International Governance, supra note 18, at 422. 
36. RAJENDRA RAMLOGAN, THE DEVELOPING WORLD AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
MAKING THE CASE FOR EFFECTIVE PROTECTION OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 202
(2004).
 37. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the
Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 429 (1991).
38. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 187-88 (2010).
 39. Mauro Barelli, The Role of Soft Law in the International Legal System: The
Case of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 58
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 957, 959 (2009).
 40. Anthony D’Amato, A Few Steps Toward an Explanatory Theory of
International Law, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2010).
 41. Timothy Meyer, Soft Law as Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 888, 889 
(2009).
 42. Larissa van den Herik & Jernej Letnar erni , Regulating Corporations 
under International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal Law
and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 725, 734 (2010).
 43. Ilias Bantekas, Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 22

































   
 
 
798 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
characterized a variety of official measures as soft law, such
as when judges include dicta in their opinions, when the
President of the United States issues a signing statement, or 
when executive agencies issue policy statements.44 Scholars 
have even branded non-governmental legislation as soft law;
norms issued by highly salient professional bodies like the
American Psychiatric Association, or the World Medical
Association have fallen under the soft law umbrella.45 Even 
transactions between private parties often use soft law
instruments, according to some scholars. Letters of intent—
a fixture in business transactions—have been labeled soft 
law instruments on the ground that they “signal[] that two
parties have an interest in further negotiations leading up to
a binding contract but rarely ha[ve] legal force . . . .”46 
Though it is impossible to use the “soft law” label in a
way that is entirely consistent with all prior uses of the term,
there is an emerging consensus on the qualities that imbue
norms with softness. At the most fundamental level, scholars
call norms soft because of where they came from, because of
the content that they have, or because of the way that they
are enforced. Separately considering these roots of softness 
will make it easier to understand the philosophical principles 
that underlie softness. 
It is popular to label norms “soft” that were promulgated 
and enforced by bodies other than national or other domestic 
44. Gersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 602-04, 622.
45. Angela Campbell & Kathleen Cranley Glass, The Legal Status of Clinical 
and Ethics Policies, Codes, and Guidelines in Medical Practice and Research, 46 
MCGILL L.J. 473, 477 (2001) (“It is therefore not surprising that most of these
guidelines have traditionally been developed by associations of particular 
professional groups.”); Stephanie Farrior, The International Law on Trafficking
in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making it Live Up to its Potential, 10 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 216 n.10 (1997) (describing World Medical Association
codes of conduct as soft law); Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional 
Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 101,
110-11 & n.52 (2008) (describing norms of the World Psychiatric Association, the
American Hospital Association, the American Geriatrics Society, and the 
American Medical Association as soft law).
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governments.47 Many scholars claim that softness arises 
when the promulgator is not a conventionally accepted
authority.48 Stable, domestic governments tend to meet this 
test rather easily because they often receive widespread 
recognition as the dominant authority in the area in which 
they mean for their norms to apply. It should come as no
surprise that international organizations have a tougher
time meeting this test. For example, soft law scholar and 
skeptic Anthony Clark Arend maintains that international
bodies cannot meet this requirement,49 claiming that the
dividing line between hard and soft is that hard law is “the 
product of the political process and enforceable through the 
political process[,]” which leads to perceptions of legitimacy
and “that actors regard the rules as binding.”50 
Even when a domestic government possesses authority
as a general matter, the individual norms that it promulgates
can be soft because they were not promulgated according to
the conventions associated with authoritative promulgation.
For instance, Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner label as “soft” 
those “rule[s] issued by a lawmaking authority that do[] not
comply with constitutional and other formalities or 
47. See, e.g., George K. Walker, Occupation in Iraq: Issues on the Periphery and
for the Future: A Rubik’s Cube Problem?, in 86 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, THE
WAR IN IRAQ: A  LEGAL ANALYSIS 219, 225-26 (Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo ed., 2010); 
Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable 
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations’
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global
Governance, 25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 74-75 (2012);
Benjamin J. Richardson, Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global
Trade, Environment and Social Governance, 8 ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 83-84 (2006)
(book review).
 48. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening
International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming 
the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 543 (2009) (“The
emerging Transnational New Governance system relies heavily on voluntary
principles, codes, procedures, and (to the extent states and IGOs are involved) 
soft law. Private schemes lack authority to promulgate hard law; they also lack
the capacity for coercive enforcement . . . .”).
 49. See AREND, supra note 11, at 20-26.
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understandings that are necessary for the rule[s] to be legally
binding.”51 
Nearly as often as scholars locate one of the roots of 
softness in the lack of a source’s perceived authority, they 
find one in the closely related feature of a source’s inability 
or failure to impose official sanctions for violations of its
norms.52 A satisfactory sanction must increase the cost of non-
compliant behavior under law.53 Thus, even if a norm has a
punishment attached, there is not a satisfactory sanction if 
that punishment merely duplicates the punishment that
exists in the absence of law. As with authority, individual
norms for which no sanction has been announced are soft
even if the promulgator is otherwise capable of imposing
them. 
Of course, there are ways to combine these two features; 
some might conceive of a lack of official sanctions as little
more than a red flag that the source does not have recognized 
authority. But we should avoid that reductionist impulse, as
we can conceive of an authoritative source that might opt not
to impose sanctions for violations of one or more of its norms.
For example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in which it declared President
Truman’s seizure of steel mills unconstitutional was widely
recognized as announcing an authoritative rule binding the
51. Gersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 579. 
52. See, e.g., JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 36 (3d ed. 2010) (characterizing soft
law as having no direct sanctions); Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through
Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an 
Example, 57 AM. J.  COMP. L. 711, 720 (2009) (same); Avi Nov, The “Bidding War”
to Attract Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 VA. TAX
REV. 835, 871-72 (2006) (same); Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts Between American 
and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 145, 
151 (2003) (same); see also Daniel E. Ho, Compliance and International Soft Law:
Why Do Countries Implement the Basle Accord?, J. INT’L ECON. L. 647, 650 (2002)
(“This view poses serious problems for the area of international soft law, mainly
because soft law entails no institutionalized enforcement by definition.”). 
53. See, e.g., Patricia Funk, Is There An Expressive Function of Law? An
Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
135, 135-36 (2007) (“The classic ‘Law & Economics’ approach focuses on
deterrence: a law enforced by a sanction increases the expected costs of the
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President, despite the fact that the Court lacked the power to 
prevent or reverse the seizure.54 The more important point,
however, is that norms that lack official sanctions, whether
because the source cannot impose them or because they have
chosen not to, are soft. 
Having considered where norms come from, we are now
ready to focus upon the norms, themselves. Norms (or, more 
accurately, norm statements) have two basic components:
operator and norm content.55 
A norm’s operator determines its deontic status, which in
most cases means that the operator describes whether and in
what capacity the content to which it applies is obligatory.56 
For example, an operator might indicate that the directive 
makes activity  mandatory (makes  obligatory), forbidden
(makes not  obligatory), or permissible (makes it not
obligatory to not ).57 Under more complicated systems, there
are operators that render a norm aspirational (  is ideal but
not obligatory) or permissibly suboptimal (  is less than
ideal, but it is not obligatory to not ).58 The norm content 
simply indicates the substance of the norm’s directive. Thus, 
in the norm statement “you must drive to the right of the
yellow line,” the “must” serves as the deontic operator, and 
the “drive to the right of the yellow line” constitutes the norm 
content. 
Soft law scholars converge in identifying three basic 
qualities that render norms soft: one arising from the 
operator, and two arising from the content. 
a. Operator-Based Softness. When people conceive of law,
they tend to envision mandatory norms, such as those that
use the operators, “must,” “may not,” and “are required to.”
54. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
55. See Paul McNamara, Making Room for Going Beyond the Call, 105 MIND 
415, 417-18 (1996).
 56. See id. at 416-17.
 57. See id. at 415-16.
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Of course, norms need not be mandatory. They may be
permissive or aspirational, among other things. In addition
to mandatory operators, there are permissive operators (e.g.,
“citizens may”) and aspirational operators (“citizens ought to,
but need not” or “should”), among others. Scholars have 
characterized norms containing non-obligatory operators as 
soft.59 For example, the World Health Organization’s Rio
Declaration, which states in pertinent part, “[a]s collective
goals, good health and well-being for all should be given high
priority at local, national, regional and international
levels[,]”60 would be a soft norm.61 
b. Content-Based Softness. Arguably, the most 
recognized source of softness is when the norm contains
indeterminate or evaluative content.62 When the directive of 
a norm is vague or evaluative, soft law scholars reason, then 
the ability of the norm to constrain disappears, leaving those 
subject to the norm free to exercise their discretion when 
applying the norm to the circumstances before them.63 
59. See Douglas M. Branson, The Social Responsibility of Large Multinational 
Corporations, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 121, 138-39 (2002); Winston P. Nagan & Craig
Hammer, Communications Theory and World Public Order: The
Anthropomorphic, Jurisprudential Foundations of International Human Rights, 
47 VA. J. INT’L L. 725, 760 n.89 (2007) (“‘Soft law’ might also be comprised of
provisions from an otherwise binding international document—such as a treaty—
that are hortatory or aspirational.”); Roza Pati, States’ Positive Obligations With
Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights Breaks New 
Ground in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 79, 92 n.46 (2011).
60. Rio Political Declaration on Social Determinants of Health, World Health
Org., ¶ 7, Oct. 21, 2011, www.who.int/sdhconference/declaration/
Rio_political_declaration.pdf?ua=1.
 61. See Hans H. Hertell, Note, Arctic Melt: The Tipping Point for an Arctic 
Treaty, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L.  REV. 565, 575-76 (2009). 
62. See Leyla Davarnejad, In the Shadow of Soft Law: The Handling of
Corporate Social Responsibility Disputes Under the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 351, 364 (2011) (“Among legal 
scholars the term ‘standards’—as opposed to strict/hard/tight rules—is used for 
these kinds of [soft] norms.”); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 
391-92 (2004) (“The most common accounting of degrees of softness and hardness
of law involves the content of the law and the degree of openness in its 
articulation.”).
 63. See Roya Ghafele & Angus Mercer, ‘Not Starting in Sixth Gear’: An
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Scholars outside of the soft law literature have long been
interested in the ways in which norm content will, as a
general matter, fall short of being constraining as a result of 
vagueness or ambiguity.64 So in this regard, soft law scholars 
make clear contact with the vast scholarship concerning the 
difference between clear, specific directives (rules) and broad, 
indeterminate ones (standards), a fact that some soft law
scholars have acknowledged.65 
In the scholarly literature, a norm is a standard when it
contains criteria that, on a straightforward reading,66 force
Structure for Corporate Social Responsibility, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 41, 
44-45 (2010) (“In this respect, soft law is identifiable by the deliberately vague
nature of the obligations imposed and the consequent discretion left to the parties
being regulated. By contrast, hard law is precise, clear and unambiguous.”).
 64. See, e.g., Samuel Williston, An Ambiguity in the Negotiable Instruments
Law, 23 HARV. L. REV. 603, 603 (1910) (“When it is considered how carefully the
Negotiable Instruments Law has been examined by critics, and how long the
practical working of the Act has been tested, it may seem odd to discover now an
ambiguity in a section of the statute which involves a question arising every week
in the business of every large bank.”).
 65. See Davarnejad, supra note 62, at 358-60. It bears noting that a small
number of soft law scholars are reluctant to include indeterminate norms under
the soft law umbrella. Compare Gersen & Posner, supra note 17, at 584 (excluding 
“ambiguous” norm content), with Lobel, supra note 62, at 391-92 (“The most
common accounting of degrees of softness and hardness of law involves the
content of the law and the degree of openness in its articulation.”), and Anna di
Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 505 (2006) (“Advocates
of soft law claim that social integration is best effected through multilevel
decentralized processes resulting in open-ended and flexible guidelines and
standards. Conversely, defenders of hard law insist that social policies must be
pursued through a centralized, vertical and formal decision-making process
yielding uniform and binding rules creating justiciable rights.”). One objection to
their inclusion is that standards can be made more specific with canons of
construction or repeated judicial application in a system of precedent. See Gersen
& Posner, supra note 17, at 623. This is why we must be careful to limit softness
to norms that at the time of analysis fall close to the standard end of the
spectrum—“pure” standards. Other scholars are reluctant to group standards
with soft law to avoid the implication that standards are a lesser norm because
they have been labeled “soft.” See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Neither Rules Nor 
Standards, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 554-55 (2011).
66. Of course, there are surely myriad ways in which an interpretation might
be permissible within a normative system, but academics who write about the
softness of a norm’s content typically presume that those who monitor compliance 
with the norm will accept straightforward interpretations. See Frederick Schauer,
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the interpreter to make evaluative judgment—for example, 
language such as “reasonable,” “moral,” “improper,” and
“unfair.” Contrariwise, a norm is a rule when it contains 
criteria that, on a straightforward reading, provide clear 
guidance about what falls within the scope of the directive. 
Thus, bright-line criteria are characteristic of rules—for
example, tests with numerical minima or maxima, such as
“forty miles per hour.” 
Scholars seeking to characterize norms as rules or 
standards run into the difficulty that there is a vast space 
between these two categories. Some norms use bright-line
criteria but lack specificity in the contexts in which they are
sometimes applied.67 Other norms might incorporate
evaluative terminology, but they have been supplemented 
with authoritative examples of concrete application,68 such as 
when a court applies the norm to a distinct set of facts and 
renders a decision. Those judicial applications give the norm 
the power to provide adequately specific guidance when 
similar circumstances arise again.69 Because specificity
makes a continuum, it is clear that the dividing line between 
soft and hard norm content is a blurry one. It will suffice for
the moment to say that softness due to indeterminacy is of 
the sort that must fall close to the standards end of the 
continuum so as to allay any concern that the norm might be 
better characterized as a rule. In other words, the standard 
must be pure.
Less commonly, scholars will call norms soft that simply
duplicate pre-existing norms—even if those norms are clear,
bright-line rules.70 When we turn our attention to the 
67. The most famous example might be Hart’s norm, “No vehicles in the park,” 
which is adequately specific when applied to a moving automobile but not so clear
when applied to roller skates or an immobile tank set up in a war memorial. See 
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].
 68. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1904 (2008).
 69. See, e.g., Schauer, Tyranny, supra note 21, at 806-07.
 70. See Curtis F.J. Doebbler, A Complex Ambiguity: The Relationship Between
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Other African Union 
Initiatives Affecting Respect for Human Rights, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
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positivist underpinnings of skepticism, this feature takes on 
greater significance. 
 
We now have a fairly extensive list of the qualities that
have been linked to norm softness. The regulator of the norm 
might lack authoritative pedigree, or it might not choose to
impose sanctions. The norm, itself, might have a non-
mandatory operator (such as an aspirational one), might not
adequately specify what its directive is, or might merely 
duplicate obligations that already exist. The following Figure
displays these characteristics.
Figure 1: The Roots of Softness
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The question we now face is whether there is some way
to unite these qualities into a single, coherent theory of law
that can explain and justify soft law skepticism. In other
words, is there a way to unite the hard/soft distinction and 
the law/non-law distinction under a single theory?
Fortunately, we are not starting with a blank slate. It has
become nearly customary for soft law scholars to link
skepticism to legal positivism.71 Unfortunately, scholars 
almost always refrain from describing the link in detail,72 or,
if they do, they do not discuss all of the varieties of softness 
that are necessary to unite completely the two theories.73 In
the following Part, I will elaborate upon this relationship,
showing how dimensions of positivism underlie each one of
the characteristics of softness that we have described. In
71. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: 
RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3 (2012) (“Similarly, legal philosophers,
especially of the positivist bent, have argued that international financial law does
not qualify as ‘law,’ given the absence of a centralized, coercive authority . . . .”);
José E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences, 38 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 405, 421 (2003) (“Others, especially positivists, have argued that
the very term ‘soft law’ is an oxymoron that erroneously suggests that binding
authority lies along a spectrum . . . .”); Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in 
International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 1075, 1083 (2008) (“It is the qualification of those acts with a soft instrumentum 
as soft law which has attracted most of the positivist attack.”); Gregory C. Shaffer 
& Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1147, 1164 n.94 (2011) (“Positivist legal scholars, for example, find that soft
law is inferior to hard law because it lacks formally binding obligations that can
be interpreted and enforced by courts.”); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of
Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 
56 INT’L ORG. 339, 340 (2002) (“[M]ost public international lawyers, realists and
positivists consider soft law to be inconsequential.”).
 72. See, e.g., Ian Johnstone, Law-Making Through the Operational Activities of
International Organizations, 40 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 87, 114-15 (2008);
Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A
Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 166-67
(2006).
 73. See, e.g., Tai-Heng Cheng, Making International Law Without Agreeing
What It Is, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2011) (discussing kinds of
legal positivism in relation to soft law but not discussing all varieties of soft law);
Kevin T. Jackson, Rethinking Economic Governance: A Naturalistic Cosmopolitan 
Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 54-58 (2013) (discussing 
positivism at length but concentrating on emerging soft law syndicates in


































 807 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
doing so, I illustrate that soft law skepticism is best 
understood as a claim about the function of norms possessing
soft characteristics and, in particular, about their incapacity
to perform the essential service that law claims to provide. I
am not the first person to navigate these waters,74 but I
attempt to explore them more thoroughly than my
predecessors have.  
II. THE THEORETICAL BASIS FOR SOFT LAW SKEPTICISM 
The most rigorous analysis of the requirements for 
legality comes from the tradition of analytic legal philosophy, 
where legal positivists occupy the dominant position.
Generally speaking, positivists are united by a fairly 
uncontroversial idea—namely, that it is possible for the test
of a norm’s legality to be based on a set of conditions that are 
social in nature rather than moral.75 People posit what the
law is; the law is a social fact. As a result of this Social Fact
Thesis, the legality of a norm must be based upon whether
that norm has come from a certain socially pedigreed source
or convention—such as whether the norm has been posited 
by a sovereign—rather than whether it satisfies a moral or 
similarly evaluative test—such as whether the norm
advances basic human goods.76 Being a positivist means that
you accept that law comes ultimately from some sort of social 
fact, but it does not necessarily mean that you believe that a 
society cannot make morality part of their legal tests. Those 
who believe that morality cannot be so incorporated are
called exclusive legal positivists (hereinafter “exclusive 
positivists”), and those that believe it can are called inclusive 
legal positivists (hereinafter “inclusive positivists”).77 The
74. See Oren Perez, Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble
Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indexes and New Ensemble 
Politics, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 543, 550-60 (2011).
 75. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of
Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 730 
(2006) (“The most fundamental of positivism’s core commitments is the Social
Fact Thesis, which asserts that law is, in essence, a social creation or artefact.”).
 76. Christopher P. Taggart, How Can ‘Positivism’ Account for Legal 
Adjudicative Duty?, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 170-71 (2013).
77. John T. Valauri, Dialectical Jurisprudence: Aristotle and the Concept of
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primary focus of my analysis (and criticism) in the remainder 
of this Article concerns a particular brand of exclusive 
positivism: one that relies on a functionalist test for legality.
I do not challenge other forms of positivism or, more 
generally, the Social Fact Thesis. A subset of legal positivists
takes a harder view, however. Exclusive positivists believe
that a law’s foundation can only be based upon a social test. 
It will be useful to explain how these theories came 
about, as well as the problems that they sought to address.
With that spadework completed, it will be much easier to
show how only exclusive positivism unites the various roots 
of softness under a single account of legality.
A. The Evolution of a Service-Based Concept of Law 
It has become a mainstream view for analytic legal
theorists, the majority of whom are legal positivists, to
demarcate the concept of law based, in part, on the
distinctive78 manner in which law claims to help those subject 
to it. Prominent exclusive positivist Scott Shapiro claims,
“the primacy that positivism affords to social facts reflects a 
fundamental truth about law, namely, that the law guides
conduct through the authoritative settlement of moral and
political issues.”79 This was not always the case, however. In 
this Part, I discuss how positivists, particularly exclusive
positivists, arrived at this position in an effort to show how 
the various concessions and assumptions that positivists
adopted along the way form critical components of their test
for legality. 
78. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 71 (2001) [hereinafter COLEMAN, 
PRACTICE] (“The prevalent view among legal positivists today is that law purports
to govern conduct as a practical authority. The distinctive feature of law's
governance on this view is that it purports to govern by creating reasons for 
action.”).
 79. Scott J. Shapiro, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the
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1. The Turn Away From Coercion and Towards 
Accepted Obligation 
In the beginning of modernity, legal positivists largely
believed that that the essence of law resided in its power to
announce the commands of the sovereign and, most
importantly, to communicate to those subject to the sovereign
that the failure to obey the sovereign’s commands would 
result in the imposition of a sanction.80 The focus of this
“Command Theory” of law was on law’s power over its 
subjects through sanction, rather than on the internal 
mechanics of deliberation under law.81 That is, theorists were
most concerned with explaining the source and power of legal 
systems rather than explaining what we do when we obey the 
law and how obedience to law can be rational. It was assumed 
that, without the presence of some sort of sovereign who has
the power to impose sanctions, a system of norms could not
qualify as a legal system.82 
Although the Command Theory reigned supreme among
legal positivists for more than a century, its dominance came 
to an abrupt halt when H.L.A. Hart illustrated how the 
theory failed adequately to distinguish law from a distinctly
non-legal situation—that of a gunman in a bank.83 When law 
works, we perceive ourselves as being obligated to follow it
and therefore perform or abstain from an action that we
otherwise would have performed or abstained from,
respectively. Our embrace of the law as an authoritative
obligation distinguishes our experience of law-following from 
coercive experiences, such as being held up by a gunman. The
gunman demands that we hand over our wallets on the
ground that failure to do so will result in considerable harm,
80. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government, in 1 WORKS 263, 293-
94 (Russell & Russell, Inc. 1962) (1838).
 81. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE, DETERMINED 16 
(Prometheus Books 2000) (1861) (“But where there is the smallest chance of
incurring the smallest evil, the expression of a wish amounts to a command, and,
therefore, imposes a duty. The sanction, if you will, is feeble or insufficient; but
still there is a sanction, and, therefore, a duty and a command.”).
 82. See id. at 147.
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which we seek to avoid; whereas our obligation to law stems
from legal officials’ and even citizens’ belief that the legally
mandated conduct “may be properly demanded or extracted
from him according to legal rules or principles regulating
such demands for action.”84 While this Hartian account seems
better to describe the phenomenology of obedience to law
than does the Command Theory, we might still wonder what
it means to say that there is a legal obligation and that one
has followed it. 
2. What is Legal Obligation? 
A useful way to understand how legal norms obligate us
is to conceive of legal obligation as a relationship between a
norm and a person who believes herself or himself to be
subject to that norm. In that relation, the person is primarily
concerned with two things: who issued the norm and its
content. When we are obligated by a norm, we are obligated
because of the source from which the norm came to apply to
us; we have come to accept the norm-giver as having the
power or authority to obligate us, at least so long as the norm-
giver follows the procedure set up to make a norm
authoritative. Once we recognize that a norm comes from an
authoritative source, the content of the norm is able to
change what we believe we must do.
Starting with the source of the norm, Hart claimed that
for a legal system to exist, the norm-giver must be
conventionally understood by a group subject to the norm to
have the authority to create obligations within a
jurisdiction.85 By this, Hart meant that a suitable number of
the members of that system, particularly its officials, have
committed themselves to the position that a norm-giver has 
that authority.86 Sources become authoritative through the
development of a conventional, social rule to that effect. 
According to Hart’s popular model, this social rule (a “rule of
recognition”) identifies which norms achieve legal status and
84. See H.L.A. Hart, Legal Duty and Obligation, in  ESSAYS ON BENTHAM: 
STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 125, 160 (1982).
 85. See HART, CONCEPT, supra note 29, at 55-60.
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therefore carry legal obligation.87 The rule of recognition 
forms the foundation of the legal system, and it arises out of
the conventional behavior among officials, such as judges.88 
Hart provided a couple of guideposts to determine 
whether such a social rule has been created, among them
that the social rules must be taken as standards of legitimate
criticism by officials within the group and that there must be
widespread obedience to the directives that receive legal 
status from the rule of recognition.89 If a source is
authoritative by merit of a social rule, then the norms that
the source legislates in compliance with that rule—if we 
follow Hart’s approach—are imbued with that authority.
That means those who view the source as authoritative 
generally consider that the content of these norms make up 
obligatory directives.90 
How does obedience to legal authority manifest itself? We
can tell that obedience has occurred by observing the manner
in which those subject to the norm decide what to do with 
respect to the activities that the norm governs. In general,
law commands us to follow it simply because it is the law, not
because we like what it is commanding. This means that if a
legal norm is supposed to change our deliberation, as is 
assumed, then our engagement with the norm has to be more
than determining whether we favor doing what it says.
Merely deciding in our own pure discretion whether a rule is
worth following cannot count as an instance of obedience to
that rule. This is the dynamic of obligation; we must perform
under an obligation even if we would, on the balance of
reasons, prefer not to.91 Hart called this principle “content-
87. See id. at 93-95.
 88. See id. at 57-60.
 89. See id. at 56-57.
 90. See id. at 93-94. Hart refers to the directives under the rule of recognition
as “primary rules,” but I will simply refer to them as directives for simplicity’s
sake.
 91. See Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain 
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independence.”92 It is the essence of obedience for post-Hart
positivism.  
Thus formed, a legal obligation is designed to alter our 
decisionmaking. When a legal norm says that a subject is
“required to ,” that norm does not seek to make us choose
whether we would prefer to ; rather it purports to obligate
us to  by changing how or even whether we deliberate about 
the merits of . Legal positivists disagree over whether our 
legal obligations trump all other considerations: some argue
that, once it applies, law eliminates the need for further 
deliberation; whereas others argue that other considerations 
remain, leaving the need for further (albeit augmented)
deliberation in at least some cases. They generally agree,
however, that law must be the sort of thing that, to some 
extent, can change our deliberation through its obligations.93 
Thus, a legal norm, itself, must have the capacity to force us 
to change our understanding of the balance of the weight of 
the reasons in favor of performing the action proscribed in 
the law’s directive (or not performing the act prohibited
therein) versus the weight of the reasons against doing so
when we deliberate. 
Since following an obligation means that one does the
action required even if he or she believes, on the balance of 
reasons, that it is not the best thing to do, the question
remains as to how it can be rational for one willingly to 
92. See H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in  ESSAYS
ON BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 243, 243-68
(1982).
 93. See COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 71 (“The prevalent view among
legal positivists today is that law purports to govern conduct as a practical
authority. The distinctive feature of law’s governance on this view is that it
purports to govern by creating reasons for action.”); JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 7 
(2009) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION] (“[T]he law sets things
straight: telling people ‘this is what you should do and whether you agree that
this is so or not, now that it is the law that you should you have the law as a new,
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assume a legal obligation.94 The problem with the obligation-
based account is that it is not clear how it justifies following
the law in disregard of the reasons that one wholeheartedly
believes militate against following it. Robert Paul Wolff
argued that this form of obedience is incompatible with basic
notions of human autonomy, which presuppose that we have
a duty to act on own our own assessment of what is right on
the balance of reasons.95 How can it be better to follow the 
directive of another when we wholeheartedly believe that
directive to be wrong? 
To respond to this challenge, legal positivists sought to
devise ways that law could serve, not merely as a means for
the sovereign to impose its will, but as a tool for the benefit
of those who are subject to it. In particular, positivists
became more interested in how law might improve
deliberation, thus making obedience to law rational.96 It is 
here that the functionalist wing of legal positivism begins to
take center stage. Law must be the sort of thing that is
capable of performing a deliberative service to those who are
obedient to it. 
We should start with the basic notion that law’s service 
is tied to its power to improve our deliberation. It is clear that
a background assumption of this notion is that we are 
imperfect deliberators without law’s help. Otherwise, no 
norm could benefit us. This is a truism of human nature; we
neglectfully omit reasons from consideration, suffer from
bias, are forgetful, and sometimes lack adequate knowledge
of the area of concern, to name just a few. Having established 
94. See  COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 71 (discussing shift from
Command Theory to focus on law's ability to create reasons for action as a
practical authority).
 95. See Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1620
(1991); see generally  ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970)
(arguing that individual autonomy is incompatible with the notion of de jure state
authority because of conflict of obligations).
 96. See Scott J. Shapiro, How Rules Affect Practical Reasoning, in REASONS AND
INTENTIONS 133, 151 (Bruno Verbeek ed., 2008) (“How would someone go about
proving that the Constraint Model for rules is the correct conceptual analysis of
rule-guidance? In short, one would try to show that for every, or nearly every,
class of rules, if the Constraint Model were false, no plausible rationalization
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that we have this infirmity, the question remains as to how 
law might help. 
The most influential and well-respected answers to this 
question come from exclusive positivists Joseph Raz and 
Scott Shapiro. Raz offered a groundbreaking account of how
legal obedience satisfies the demands of rationality called the
Service Conception of Law.97 Therein, he claims that law’s
essential service is to improve our ability to act on the right
balance of all reasons, which, Raz believes, is an
improvement to our ability to act in the moral way.98 Law 
makes us better deciders. 
To perform this service, law necessarily claims to be a
legitimate authority for those to whom it applies.99 Law
serves as an authority to us when we allow law’s directives 
to exclude our consideration of the balance of reasons that
are within the scope of those directives (“background
reasons”) and to replace those reasons with one that weighs 
in favor of following the directive (“protected reason”).100 It 
should be the case that we are more likely to act on the
balance of reasons—or to act morally—than we would have
in the absence of the law.101 On this model, law is an
“exclusionary reason.” 
Stacking the deck in favor of its directives is how 
authorities help us. If authorities are better at balancing
reasons than we are, or at least are better at it within a
certain scope, then it is possible for their exclusionary
reasons to make us more likely to decide in accordance with 
the best balance of reasons. Such circumstances illustrate
how obedience can be rational.  
According to Raz:
97. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 55-56 (1986) [hereinafter RAZ, 
MORALITY].
 98. See Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, in  AUTHORITY 115, 131-32
(Joseph Raz ed., 1990). 
99. See id. at 132.
 100. See RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 97, at 41-42, 57-59. 
101. Legitimate laws, and the directives of legitimate authorities generally,
preempt the background reasons that might militate against the authoritative








































 815 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
The normal way to establish that a person has authority over
another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely
better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the
alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives of the 
alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow 
them, rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to
him directly.102 
By preventing us from considering reasons within the
scope of the norm, law improves our decisionmaking; it helps 
us by constraining us to make choices that are better than
the choices we would have made in its absence.
The approach of the other leading exclusive positivist,
Scott Shapiro, shares Raz’s view that law is distinctive due
to the function that it provides for us, but his account of this
function is based not on law’s claim to be a legitimate
authority, but on the notion that law is a type of planning 
institution that claims to solve moral problems.103 Law arises
when a community encounters moral disagreements whose 
solutions are so complex, contentious, or arbitrary that an
elaborate planning system becomes the best option among
alternatives.104 To do this, it limits deliberation:
To serve as a plan, we might say, it is not necessary for a law to 
eliminate moral reasoning. Rather it need only displace the need
for some such deliberation. As long as it takes certain issues “off 
the table” and channels deliberation in a particular direction, the
rule will fulfill its function as a plan.105 
Thus, law is the sort of thing that can make this kind of
practical difference to our deliberation. Having discussed 
law’s essential service, it is now time to begin considering
how to use this function as a means to test for legality. 
102. RAZ, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 93, at 53 (emphasis
omitted).
 103. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 213 (2011) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, LEGALITY]
(“[T]he fundamental aim of the law is to rectify the moral deficiencies associated
with the circumstances of legality.”).
 104. See id. at 225.
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4. What Content Renders Norms Incapable of
Performing Law’s Service? 
Raz and Shapiro believe that the way to test for legality 
is to determine a norm’s fitness for providing the beneficial 
deliberative service that law claims to provide.  
Several high-profile legal positivists—Jules Coleman,106 
Joseph Raz,107 and Scott Shapiro,108 among others—have said 
that, while law does not uniformly succeed in improving our
decisionmaking through its obligations, it does uniformly 
claim that it will do so. And the only way that a system can
make such a claim legitimately is if it is possible for it to
perform that service. Thus, determining whether a norm is
legal involves identifying whether that norm, by necessity,
cannot perform the beneficial service. While passing this test
does not guarantee that a norm is a law, passage is a
necessary condition for legality.
It will be helpful to revisit the inclusive/exclusive
distinction now that we have a better sense of the history of
ideas leading up to its development. Exclusive positivists who
subscribe to the service-based understanding of legality take
a harder line than inclusive positivists regarding the kind of 
content that is fit for the service. Inclusive positivists follow
Hart’s lead in accepting that virtually any content might be
capable of performing a beneficial service.109 Thus, inclusive 
positivists receive their name because they are inclusive as 
to legal content. Exclusive positivists, on the other hand,
adopt both restrictive conditions for what qualifies as a legal 
source, but they also assert that only certain content is
106. See Coleman, Architecture, supra note 29, at 16.
 107. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY v-
vi (1979) [hereinafter RAZ, AUTHORITY OF LAW].
 108. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 215 (“If we want to explain what
makes the law the law, we must see it as necessarily having a moral aim, an end 
that criminal organizations do not necessarily possess. . . . [T]he difference
between legal systems and these criminal syndicates is not that the former are in
fact morally better than the latter; rather, the distinguishing factor is that it is in
the nature of the former that they are supposed to be so.”).
 109. See Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical
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capable of allowing law to perform its service. 110 All other
content is excluded.  
Raz and Shapiro agree that legal norms must, in
principle, be capable of making a practical difference to the
structure or content of deliberation or action through its non-
optionality.111 Most visibly, the practical difference takes the
form of behavioral constraint, during which a subject
performs an action to comply with the norm’s directive that
is different from the action she would have performed in the 
absence of the norm. But it might happen internally, such as 
when one simply considers different reasons in favor of or
against an action.
Of course, Raz and Shapiro offer their own accounts of
the form that this practical difference takes in our 
reasoning.112 Raz offers an elaborate account of exclusionary 
reasons that make consideration of the background reasons
covered within the scope of a norm off-limits. The notion is 
that the content of the directive must indicate that some 
range of reasons that might have been considered during
deliberation is no longer considerable. Raz maintains,
110. See id. at 383-84.
 111. See Robin Bradley Kar, Hart's Response to Exclusive Legal Positivism, 95 
GEO. L.J. 393, 398-401 (2007). Most inclusive positivists, too, share this basic
notion. H.L.A. Hart believed that legal norms are “peremptory” second-order
reasons, meaning that they provide one with a reason to abstain from considering
any of the first-order reasons that otherwise would have borne upon the decision
of how to act, and they then replace those reasons with new first-order reasons to
comply with the legal directive. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Economic Rationality 
in the Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 67, 71 (Martin P. Golding & William A.
Edmundson eds., 2005). Thus, to comply with a legal norm means that its second-
order reason has prevented the subject from considering the merits of , leaving
her only to consider the fact that the law has directed her to  when she is 
considering the first-order reasons regarding whether to , which of course tips
the balance in favor of  because there is now no other reason against which the
law’s first-order reason can compete. In a sense, there is no deliberation left to do
after the second-order reason does its work—it has knocked all of the competing
reasons off of the scale. We can thus categorize Hart among those positivists who
link guidance by law with complete deliberation foreclosure.
 112. See generally Edward F. McClennen, Rethinking Rationality, in REASONS
AND INTENTIONS, 37 (Bruno Verbeek ed., 2008) (discussing differences between
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however, that subjects are free to balance reasons that are
outside the scope of the norm—meaning those reasons that
were not meant to be under consideration when the norm was
adopted—against the reason provided by the norm.113 This 
distinguishes him from Shapiro, who believes that law takes
prior decisions about the manner in which to achieve a goal, 
as well as the goal, itself, as settled.114 These differences have
been of philosophical interest to analytic legal 
philosophers,115 but they have little bearing when divining 
the line that separates law from non-law, as the same sorts
of norm content fail regardless of whether one is in Raz or
Shapiro’s camp.
For Raz, the primary circumstance in which a system of
directives is necessarily unable to make a practical difference 
is when the system leaves us to follow our own independent 
understanding of what is warranted on the balance of all 
reasons, as if the norm we are considering does not exist at 
all.116 In such cases, the system cannot qualify as a legal 
system; it fails to perform the service it is supposed to when 
we allow it to substitute its balancing of the reasons for ours. 
For an authoritative source, those subject to its norms “can 
benefit by its [norms] only if they can establish [the norm’s]
existence and content in ways which do to depend on raising 
the very same issues which the authority is there to settle.”117 
The most famous content that fails in this regard is moral 
content. According to Raz, when norms have moral criteria,
113. See RAZ, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 93, at 144. 
114. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 279.
 115. COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 78, at 121-23 (discussing the difference
between peremptory and preemptive reasons).
 116. See RAZ, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 93, at 141 (“The pre-
emptive force of authority is part and parcel of its nature. It cannot succeed as an
authority (ie, succeed in improving our conformity with reason) if it does not pre-
empt the background reasons [that the norm is designed to exclude]. The function
of authorities is to improve our conformity with those background reasons by
making us try to follow their instructions rather than the background reasons.
Authorities cannot do so without at least the possibility that their directives will 
sometimes lead us to act differently than we would have done without them.”).
 117. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW
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they simply tell us to balance the very background reasons
that the norm giver was supposed to balance for us.118 
Shapiro’s limits are similar. One manner in which a
system of plan-like norms necessarily fails is if the existence 
and content of those norms cannot be determined by facts 
whose existence the plans aim to settle.119 Because laws aim
to settle moral problems, it cannot be the case that their 
existence and content are determined by moral facts.120 No 
moral facts exist that can settle a moral problem, else that
problem would not exist in the first place, supposes Shapiro.
He writes: 
If a plan with a particular content exists only when certain moral
facts obtain, then it could not resolve doubts and disagreements
about the right way of proceeding. For in order to apply it, the
participants would have to engage in deliberation or bargaining
that would recreate the problem that the plan aimed to solve. The
logic of planning requires that plans be ascertainable by a method
that does not resurrect the very questions that plans are designed 
to settle. Only social facts, not moral ones, can serve this
function.121 
Because of Shapiro’s view that legal norms must operate
to cut off deliberation, it should be obvious that aspirational 
norms suffer from the same infirmity as evaluative norms. In
a recent article with Oona Hathaway, Shapiro admits, “To be
118. See id. at 220-21.
 119. See id. at 275.
 120. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 279 (“The more deliberation
obviated, the more complete the guidance. For example, the law might forbid
‘unreasonable restraints of trade.’ Or it might declare that ‘pricefixing, bid
rigging, and market allocation schemes’ are prohibited. Both descriptions might
apply to the same set of acts, but they represent very different plans. The former
plan is highly incomplete because it picks out the actions in question under a
morally loaded description. The guidance it provides does not obviate the need for
deliberation on the moral merits of various business practices. The latter provides
more complete guidance, not because it picks out more actions that the former,
but because it picks out those actions in a way that settles more issues than the 
former. It is possible to identify the prohibited acts without deliberating on
whether price-fixing is an unreasonable restraint of trade.”). 
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sure, law would not be morally indispensable if it were purely 
aspirational in nature.”122 
The class of norms that are necessarily unable to perform 
the service that law claims to provide are the same regardless 
of whether one follows Raz or follows Shapiro. That is, the 
same kinds of norms are excluded whether one believes that
legal norms cut off deliberation entirely, as Shapiro suggests, 
or only within a certain scope, as Raz suggests.
B. Aligning the Service Conception and Soft Law 
Skepticism 
In this Part, I will provide a typology of norm
characteristics that fail to pass muster under the 
Raz/Shapiro, service-based model of law, tying them to the
features of softness described in Part I.B. Doing so will show 
how these features will, on these accounts, stall law’s
essential deliberation-altering service. In other words, I will
unite soft law skepticism and Raz/Shapiro exclusive
positivism under the same functionalist banner. One useful 
byproduct of this exercise is that we will have a
philosophically grounded means to distinguish soft from hard 
law. It will also provide the groundwork for showing that this
soft law skepticism is unsustainable in the face of empirical 
evidence of Supercompliance. For those who are not
persuaded by my critique, perhaps the following Part is
nevertheless useful. As my relatively brief summary of the 
positivist literature shows, soft law skepticism might seem
under-theorized when held to the standards set by the 
philosophers; whereas exclusive positivism might seem
hermetic when held to the standards of the soft law
literature, which often addresses topical issues and specific
pieces of legislation. Drawing further connections between
the two projects will benefit both, I hope.
In describing Raz and Shapiro’s positions, I briefly
touched upon the sorts of norms—aspirational and moral 
122. Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic
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norms—that necessarily fail to satisfy their functional,
service-based test for legality. As the parallel between
exclusive positivism and soft law skepticism is easy to draw
with respect to these normative characteristics, it is a
suitable starting point.
a. Operator-Based Softness: Failing to Set Forth an
Obligation. Scholars include norms that use non-obligatory
operators under the banner of soft law. Like soft law skeptics, 
exclusive positivists assert that such norms are not,
themselves, capable of providing law's essential service.123 
The essence of obedience to law is accepting the law’s
obligations. On a straightforward reading, an aspirational 
norm, for example, does not set forth an obligation; rather, it
endorses conduct but expressly leaves it up to the interpreter 
to decide whether to do it. Thus, it neither operates as an
exclusionary reason nor as a deliberation forecloser and 
therefore does not perform the particular service that law
claims to perform.124 In short, it is obvious that soft law 
skeptics and Raz/Shapiro exclusive positivists are clearly on
the same page in this regard.125 
b. Content-Based Softness. Likewise, there is an evident
parallel between Raz/Shapiro exclusive positivists and soft 
123. See  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 59 (calling aspirational legal
norms peculiar, and that “[i]f we are not legally obligated[,] . . . then it is not true 
that we legally ought to [do it].”).
124. Insofar as we assume that posited aspirational norms mean to set a level
for supererogation, which is not at all clear, then Raz does permit the possibility
that the norm might serve as an exclusionary permission, meaning that the
subject has the option of choosing whether to exclude the reasons that tip the 
balance in favor of doing the action that is supererogatory. Importantly, the
exclusionary permission does not tip the deliberative scales towards morality in 
such cases; rather, it allows the decisionmaker the choice of deciding not to do the
most moral thing—the supererogatory action. Thus, aspirational norms are as
incapable as moral norms of performing law’s essential service on the Razian
view. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 96 (1975).
125. It is not entirely clear whether both legal positivists and soft law skeptics
apply their functionalist limitations to every individual norm within a legal
system, to most laws within a legal system, or merely to the rule of recognition.
Because my focus here is on behavioral impossibilities presumed by those groups
for norms that meet these conditions regardless of whether they are primary or
secondary rules, my reasoning here should be helpful regardless of how that
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law skeptics with respect to norm content. Recall that soft 
law scholars identified two characteristics of directives that 
give rise to softness: (1) that they were indeterminate and (2) 
that they duplicated pre-existing obligations.126 These same
characteristics have the capacity to preclude norms from
passing Raz and Shapiro’s test for legality. 
i. Specificity: Failing to Identify an Obligation. Soft law
scholars have often characterized legal “standards” as soft,
and now that we understand how law’s service works, we can 
elucidate the philosophical basis for their characterization.  
Legal philosophers generally make the same distinction
between rules and standards that other scholars do,
including soft law scholars. Hart famously claimed that we
can imagine individual norms as having a core and a
penumbra for the purposes of application.127 When the
application of a norm to a situation suitably identifies
whether a particular activity falls within its purview, then 
that application has fallen within the core, and when it does
not, then it has fallen into the penumbra.128 If it is a
penumbral application, then the interpreter must rely on
discretion in determining whether the norm makes the
activity in question legally obligatory.129 
Since it should be plain enough that both legal 
philosophers and soft law scholars understand the
rules/standards distinction in much the same way, we are 
ready to see how the distinction matters when it comes to the 
Raz/Shapiro test for legality. When norms fall at the tail end
of the spectrum on the standards side, then they are
composed entirely of penumbra and therefore cannot perform 
law’s deliberative service without supplementation. Of 
course, even rules admit of cases in which the interpreter
126. See supra Introduction. 
127. Hart, Positivism, supra note 67, at 606-07.
 128. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 
139, 146 (1982) (“Cases falling within the penumbra of a general rule, however,
are uncertain. There is no uncontroversial answer as a matter of law to them, and
judges must go beyond the law to exercise their discretion in order to resolve
them. Controversy implies the absence of legal duty and, to the extent to which
legal rules have controversial instances, positivism is committed to a theory of
discretion in the resolution of disputes involving them.”).
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finds herself in the penumbra, and in such instances, the
norm operates as a soft norm. But in most instances, the rule 
will have the specificity necessary to perform the service. In 
other words, the specificity problem arises when we have 
either a pure standard applied in any case that it is
understood to govern or another type of norm, even a rule,
when the case falls into the penumbra. Because soft law
scholars characterize norms (rather than classes of cases in
which a norm is applied) as soft due to the kinds of terms
contained within them, they likely have norms close to the
pure standard end of the spectrum in mind when they assert
that positivism underlies their reasoning. 
Turning to the connection between pure standards and 
law’s essential service, one must be able to identify what the 
particular directive within the norm is if one is to have his or
her deliberation altered by the norm. With norms that fall at
or near the very tip of the standards end of the spectrum, the
norm content has been stated such that, in the cases to which
the norm generally applies, the norm will fail to specify that
a particular conduct is subject to the norm’s deontic operator.
The norm is so vague that, even when taking into account 
other norms in that system, the interpreter is unable to tell 
whether the conduct that he or she is considering at that
moment falls within the norm’s directive. As a result, the 
person subject to the obligation within the norm is left to
decide whether the conduct ought to be performed on his or 
her own (and, thus, without the guidance of the norm).
Consequently, the norm fails to deliver its service.
It is important to emphasize how rare pure standards are
in a system of precedent. Legal norms are seldom
promulgated into a vacuum, and ambiguous standards will 
likely be interpreted with other, clearer legal norms in mind. 
As mentioned, with each application, an ambiguous standard
becomes more and more rule-ified, limiting the possible
permissible interpretations.130 We are most likely, then, to
130. See Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-
Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 491 (2000) (“As the Standard is applied over a series of
cases, it almost always becomes increasingly rule-like. This occurs because cases,






































824 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
encounter such ambiguity when legislatures use evaluative 
terms to regulate a theretofore unregulated activity, one with
which other legal norms and precedential decisions make 
little contact, or when legislatures issue norms in systems
that do not observe precedent.131 It is no coincidence that such
qualities are more likely to be present in international 
regulation.132 
ii. Duplication: Failing to Impose a New Obligation. A 
small number of soft law scholars have characterized norms
that merely duplicate preexisting obligations as soft.133 This 
is a keen insight as it comports well with the service
conception of law. Indeed, exclusive positivists have placed 
most of their attention on this particular aspect of norms, as
it is more likely to cause problems for service than specificity
in light of the rarity of pure standards. 
Even when the interpreter of a norm is able to identify
whether the conduct at issue is governed by the norm’s 
directive, it is possible that the conduct was already being
regulated in precisely the same way by earlier obligations. As 
a result, the obligation that was set forth in the norm cannot 
succeed in altering deliberation because it does not introduce
a new obligation; any deliberation alteration that could have
occurred would have been performed by the preexisting
norms, or so the thinking goes.
Exclusive positivists, including Raz and Shapiro, assert 
that moral norm content creates duplication problems. It is
popular for people, including philosophers, to believe that
morality governs us at all times and everywhere.134 Exclusive
positivists extend this notion, reasoning that it is therefore
necessary that positing a moral norm does nothing more than
become examples of what, as a concrete matter, the Standard means.”); Schauer, 
Tyranny, supra note 21, at 808.
131. I leave open the possibility that a norm might be circumstantially soft, such
as when the particular facts of a case fall squarely within a norm’s penumbra,
even if other cases would not. 
132. See Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of International Law in the 
Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 21 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 967, 994-95 (2010).
 133. See Doebbler, supra note 70, at 19.
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repeat the deontic status of what already existed. With this
background in mind, consider a statute stating, “when doing
business, you must do what morality requires.” In Razian
terms, the moral content reduces to requiring subjects to do
“that which is called for on the balance of all reasons,135 as the
natural state of being subject to morality asks us simply to 
balance all reasons. So this law really says, “when doing
business, do what is dictated on the balance of all reasons.”
Law is supposed to do that balancing for us, at least within
some scope, but the moral content passes the buck to the
interpreter. Thus, on the Razian view, the norm cannot
perform law’s service, leaving us in precisely the situation we
were in before the law intervened. For Shapiro, the argument
is nearly the same. Law comes into being in the backdrop of
moral problems. Such a norm is the equivalent of a plan that 
says, “let’s plan to rely on morality” to solve a moral 
problem.136 
Shapiro and Raz rely on the common sense argument 
that when a norm houses terminology that does nothing more
than repeat the state of affairs that exists in the absence of
the norm, it will not make a practical difference to 
deliberation. Put another way, when the content of a norm 
simply restates the deontic status of conduct as one already 
understood it to be, then the issuance of that norm should not 
cause one to believe that the status of that conduct has 
changed. Thus, the norm should not, on a straightforward 
reading, cause one to change his or her conduct. 
Although some assume that moral norm content is vague
by nature137 and group moral content in with other standards
on the ground that all of them create specificity problems, the
duplication argument shows that a moral norm need not be
vague for it to create softness. Indeed, even though 
duplication problems have received less attention among soft
135. See id.
 136. See SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 201. 
137. See, e.g., Martin Stone, Legal Positivism as an Idea About Morality, 61 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 313, 330-31 (2011) (“That justice ‘is vague and needs further
determination’ is no surprise to the natural lawyer; it is one of his
commonplaces . . . . What is new to utilitarianism is not the discovery that 
everyday morality is vague and requires circumstantial judgments, but rather a
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law scholars than specificity problems, the latter is likely
more commonplace, as the moral character of the norm does
not depend on seldom-seen indeterminacy. Rather, the
problem arises from the moral-evaluative nature of its
content. 
2. Regulator-Based Softness: Lacking the Power to Put 
the Process into Motion 
Although the parallels between the philosophers and the
soft law scholars with respect to regulator-based softness
require a bit more legwork to identify, they are no less
important. Recall that soft law scholars have articulated two
different dimensions of regulator-based softness—that the 
promulgator was not conventionally understood to be an
authority and that the enforcement of the norm was not
backed up with sanctions.138 
a. Conventional Authority. One root of softness was that
the promulgator was not understood by those regulated by
the norm to be a conventional authority. Post-Hartian
positivism simply adds flesh to that idea: authority comes 
from norm-creators who follow a conventional social rule that
bestows upon them the power to make obligations. A
promulgator can make legal obligations pursuant to a social 
rule when there exists a social convention or regularity of
behavior among a group, there is some body within that
group that identifies a norm fitting that convention,
deviations from that convention get criticized within that
body, and that criticism is viewed as legitimate (that is, the
critics are not themselves criticized for being critics).139 
Moreover, there must be widespread obedience to these 
norms.140 While positivists differ with respect to the
particulars, those positivists that I discuss in this Article all 
believe in a social convention-based foundation for legal 
systems that bears a resemblance to Hart’s account.141 
138. See supra Part I.B.1. 
139. See HART, CONCEPT, supra note 29, at 82-86.
 140. Id. at 114.
 141. See Kevin Toh, An Argument Against the Social Fact Thesis (and Some 
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The popular notion among soft law skeptics that laws 
must come from domestic governments or similarly powerful 
institutions receives support from Hart’s writing. For his
part, Hart had his doubts that international law was
governed by a rule of recognition.142 It bears noting that 
Hart’s position might be a byproduct of the immature state
of public international law when he wrote The Concept of Law
more than fifty years ago. At that time, Hart’s view that
international law was merely a network of contractual 
arrangements between nations rather than a centralized
system with legislative protocols was a more defensible 
position. As a result, it was more difficult for him to imagine
an international system in which legal officials like judges
have internalized law’s authority to the point where they 
accept content-independent obligation.143 In this respect, we 
can align the service-based account with a feature of norm
softness, thereby providing a theoretical foundation for this 
dimension of soft law skepticism. 
It is important to be clear about what I am saying
regarding this dimension of softness. One need not be a soft 
law skeptic or a Raz/Shapiro exclusive positivist to hold that
promulgation pursuant to a social rule is a necessary
condition for legality. Indeed, this understanding of legality
might comport with our ordinary linguistic practices. The 
point is, however, that the positivistic service-based account
of legality requires that the promulgator meet this
characteristic as a precondition for its deliberative service,
and this same notion underlies soft law skepticism. A 
convention of internalization of authority allows the subject 
to experience deliberation alteration without having first to
decide whether the content of the norm is the sort of thing
that they ought to believe is a fitting authoritative obligation.
The obligation is content-independent. In other words, a
LAW & PHIL. 445, 445 (2008) (“According to this conception, the central thesis of
legal positivism is that the existence of a law, or the legal validity of a norm, is
ultimately a matter solely of some facts about the psychology and/or behavior of
a group of people. Somewhat differently put: the central thesis of legal positivism,
according to many philosophers, is that the ultimate grounds of any legal claim
are only some facts about the psychology and/or behavior of a group of people.”).
 142. See HART, CONCEPT, supra note 29, at Ch. X. 
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convention of internalization is a necessary condition for the 
functional basis of soft law skepticism.
b. Sanctions. Turning now to sanctions, while there is no
longer a consensus among positivists that sanctions are a
necessary dimension of legality, this does not mean that soft 
law skepticism and positivism cannot be aligned. For one, the
necessity of sanctions is entirely consistent with Command
Theory positivism. Moreover, there is a consensus among 
contemporary positivists that, as a matter of practical 
behavioral necessity, sanctions are a necessary feature of 
legal systems.144 And there is a recent movement afoot among 
legal theorists to resurrect the notion that sanctions are a
conceptually necessary component of legality.145 Lastly, Hart,
himself, believed it appropriate to use sanctions as a factor 
in determining legality, at least in the domestic context.146 
For those who are nevertheless eager to have perfect 
conceptual harmony between the soft law and positivist 
literatures, there are two ways that we can embrace the
notion that sanctions make norms soft with post-Command 
Theory positivism. First, one might argue that an absence of 
sanctions communicates something about the content of the 
norms that lack them. In light of the fact that sanctions are 
so pervasive in legal systems, we might take their absence as
an indication that the source, itself, does not intend the 
sanction-less norms to be binding, and we might therefore 
144. Frederick Schauer, The Best Laid Plans, 120 YALE L.J. 586, 607 (2010)
(“For a social plan to be effective, the members of society, absent sanctions, will
need to set aside not only their self-interested desires but also their own views of
what the group ought now to do for the group’s benefits. But this subjugation of
individual views, required by the notion of planning, is systematically unlikely to
occur without the threat of force. Sanctions are therefore a predictable necessity
whose importance emerges once we see the systematically frustrating dimension
of social plans.”).
 145. See MATTHEW H. KRAMER, IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL POSITIVISM: LAW WITHOUT 
TRIMMINGS 84-89 (1999); Danny Priel, Sanction and Obligation in Hart’s Theory
of Law, 21 RATIO JURIS. 404, 404-08 (2008); see generally Ekow N. Yankah, The
Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH. L.  REV. 1195 (2008) 
(claiming that a normative system cannot be differentiated or understood as the
law without coercion).
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add the silent postscript to each norm that “this norm is non-
binding.” Kenneth Himma has articulated a similar idea:
At the very least, this much seems reasonable: in cases where (1)
formal coercive mechanisms are generally authorized for non-
compliance and (2) officials lack authority to apply these 
mechanism in enforcing a particular judgment, norm, or order with
coercive mechanisms, it is implausible to characterize the 
judgment, norm, or order as “obligatory.” Such norms are more
fairly characterized as “advisory” because there is no sense in which
the relevant behavior is made mandatory by mechanisms
reasonably presumed to have normative relevance given human 
beings as we understand them.147 
Along those same lines, we might say that the absence 
of sanctions is a sign that there exists no social rule
empowering that source to be authoritative. Given the sheer
desirability of sanctions from the standpoint of any putative
authority, it might be argued that their absence signals that
a jurisdiction was unwilling to, or otherwise did not, adopt 
the convention that that source is an authority. Put
differently, we might argue that the use of the social rule as 
a standard of criticism is shown only when sanctions are
imposed.148 This is a bolder claim than Hart would likely have 
made,149 of course, but he and other positivists assert at a
minimum that sanctions are a central but strictly
unnecessary feature of legality.150 In either case, the problem 
is the same: the source of the norm lacks a social rule imbuing
their norms with the power to obligate. 
147. Kenneth Einar Himma, A Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal 
Obligation: Social Pressure, Coercive Enforcement, and the Legal Obligations of
Citizens 25 (Sept. 4, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2141033. 
148. In addition, there is a practical affinity between a type of norm-based
softness and a lack of sanctions. When a norm does not impose an obligation
because of its operator, such as with a norm that is aspirational, then there is an
argument that it is logically entailed that the norm will not have a sanction.
Regardless of the logic, it is certainly true that such norms do not generally have
sanctions attached. 
149. I owe Christopher Essert for the point that precisely the opposite inference
could be drawn from the absence of sanctions—that the people of a jurisdiction so
deeply accept the norm-giver as an authority that sanctions are completely
unnecessary.
 150. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION
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Thus, there is at least an affinity between legal
positivism, including exclusive positivism, and soft law
skepticism with respect to the necessity of sanctions. 
C. Summing Up and a Word on the Law/Non-Law 
Distinction 
My goal has been to establish that we can unite all
aspects of norm softness that appear in the literature with an 
exclusive positivist concept of legality and that this union
supports soft law skepticism by providing a rigorous 
theoretical foundation. The following Table illustrates how
the soft/hard distinction—the aspects of which are listed in
the left column—merge with the law/non-law distinction by
preventing the norm at issue from achieving legal status due
to its incapacity to perform law’s essential service—examples 
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Characteristic of
Softness




Absence of Promulgating body Subjects do not perceive
Social Rule does not resemble
domestic
government
the norm as obligatory
because no convention of
obligatory obedience
exists
Absence of Regulator lacks Subjects do not perceive
Sanctions power to impose
sanctions or does
not link a norm to
its sanctioning
mechanism
the norm as obligatory or
otherwise worth following
Non-Obligatory Norm uses terms Subjects do not perceive
Operator like “ought,” or
“should”
the norm as obligatory
and/or believe it merely
sets forth a moral
standard (see Duplicates
Pre-Existing Obligations)









an obligation and are left
to exercise their own
unfettered discretion
Duplicates Pre- Norm content Subjects can identify only





obligated and which did
not solve the problem
that they face
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For the remainder of this Article, I critique soft law
skepticism. To do this, I will show how soft norms are capable
of performing the very same service that those scholars
believe distinguishes law from non-law. Although it is
technically a distinct issue, I realize that a successful critique 
might leave some readers wondering where I draw the line 
between law and non-law. It will be best to take care of any
lingering concerns before turning our attention to empirical 
findings. 
As for my views regarding the conditions necessary to
distinguish law from non-law, I should say at the outset that
I see nothing particularly objectionable about the
functionalist concept of law that I have described thus far; I 
object only to the assertion that soft norms cannot meet its 
test for legality, not to the test, itself.151 
To dispel any notion that this Article opens the door for 
anything to be legal so long as it performs those functions, I
am willing to concede that a norm possessing all of the roots 
of softness described here is not likely to satisfy the minimum
requirements of a functionalist legality. Further analysis of 
the minimum requirements should be unnecessary for 
present purposes.
I can see the merit in taking a non-functionalist approach
as well. We might consider a linguistic test, for example—one
that relies upon ordinary uses of the word “law” to arrive at
shared folk intuitions, which can then be formed into
something like a concept for legality.152 I suspect that any
151. Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART'S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE
POSTSCRIPT TO ‘THE CONCEPT OF LAW’ 149, 191 (Jules L. Coleman ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Shapiro, Hart’s Way Out] (“In this essay, I have tried to show why
Raz's use of the word 'law' is neither arbitrary nor stipulative. Exclusive legal
positivism represents the idea that legal institutions have certain functions and
those functions all involve the guidance of conduct through rules. . . . Exclusive
legal positivism, therefore, is forced on the legal positivist who is committed to a
functionalist conception of law."). 
152. I have in mind something like a soft version of the Canberra Plan, stripped
of any a priori pretense. See, e.g., Daniel Nolan, Canberra Plan, in A COMPANION
TO PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND 98, 100 (Graham Oppy & N.N. 
Trakakis eds., 2010) (“So far I have been describing the Canberra Plan method as
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such concept would be friendlier to some of the aspects of
softness than others. The lack of a social convention is likely
more critical to our usage of “law” or conceptually related 
terms153 than the other aspects of softness, such as of lack
sanctions or specificity. As a consequence, we might follow
exclusive positivists and skeptics and characterize norms 
from un-authoritative sources as non-legal but (critically) not
for the functional reasons that they assert.
III. NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE 
The basis for soft law skepticism is a set of bold
assertions regarding the incapacity of soft norms to make
practical differences to the deliberation of those subject to
them. In this Part, I would like to describe a phenomenon,
which, if it exists, proves that soft law has the capacity to
create the very practical differences that skeptics deny. That
phenomenon is Norm Supercompliance. Norm
Supercompliance is not limited to legal contexts, and many
of the examples that I cite do not concern settings that
purport to be legal in nature.
It might be objected that soft law skepticism rests on
purely conceptual claims about law, and therefore no amount 
of empirical evidence will show that it is unwarranted.154 For 
example, exclusive positivists and skeptics might argue that
their views are simply entailed by the one true concept of law.
I disagree. Positivism and soft law skepticism are best
understood not as an analytic explication of our concept of
few things might meet, and locates a best deserver for an eventual identity
claim.”).  
153. Cf. Jules L. Coleman & Ori Simchen, “Law,” 9 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2003)
(discussing semantics of “law”). 
154. See  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 406-07 n.16 (“Social science
cannot tell us what the law is because it studies human society. Its deliverances
have no relevance for the legal philosopher because it is a truism that nonhumans
could have law. Science fiction, for example, is replete with stories involving alien
civilizations with some form of legal system. These examples show that it is part
of our concept of law that groups can have legal systems provided that they are
more or less rational agents and have the ability to follow rules. Social scientific
theories are limited in this respect, being able to study only human groups, and
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law, but rather as both an articulation of the way we actually
experience obedience to law and an explanation of how such 
obedience is rational. Others have made similar claims. For
instance, Oren Perez characterizes the relationship between
soft law and positivism thusly:  
Taking the positivist conceptualization as a premise entails a
reinterpretation of the soft law/hard law distinction in terms of a 
juxtaposition between law and non-law, making the reliance on soft
law as a means of generating social change somewhat suspicious.
This binary interpretation of legal normativity is, however, not
more than a working hypothesis.155 
While I share Perez’s belief that these theories make
claims about behavior, I am more charitable to them.
Understood in that way, it is clear that they are useful claims
about the actual world, identifying prima facie functionalist 
limits on the conditions under which a norm can benefit a
subject. In doing so, they make determinations of legality
useful: they are predictive of conduct under norms and,
therefore, of progress towards individual and social goals.
While this might rob positivism of any legitimate claims to
universality, there are fewer in its ranks that believe such
claims are possible. Brian Leiter is a leader of this movement,
stating “a satisfactory theory of adjudication must be
continuous with empirical inquiry in the natural and social 
sciences”156 and that we ought to be “skeptical about
intuition-driven methods of philosophy and conceptual
analysis . . . [because] the facts matter for philosophy.”157 
Legal theorists have begun to embrace the approach,158 one
155. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 74, at 559.
 156. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 285 (1997). 
157. Brian Leiter, Against Convergent Moral Realism: The Respective Roles of
Philosophical Argument and Empirical Evidence, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION AND DIVERSITY 133 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong ed., 2008).
 158. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 
1909, 1924-25 (2004); Brian Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific
Approaches to the Concept of Law, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 501, 508 (1995);
William Twining, General Jurisprudence, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 31 
(2007) (“Recently, there have been encouraging signs of a convergence between 
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that Hart, himself, gestured towards when he described his 
work in The Concept of Law as “descriptive sociology.”159 I will
proceed to consider examples that conflict with the exclusive
positivist and skeptical account. 
Turning now to the phenomenon of Norm 
Supercompliance, itself, I will first provide a brief 
hypothetical example from a familiar setting to serve as a 
reference point.
A. An Illustrative Example 
Imagine that Laura, a thirteen-year-old, loves to watch 
television. Her parents typically let her watch from 7:00 p.m. 
until about 9:30 p.m., at which time she is told that she must
begin preparing to go to bed. This Friday is special—Laura’s 
parents have arranged to go out to dinner, and Laura will be
left home alone for the first time. As Laura’s parents are
gathering their things to leave, Laura sits down on the couch
eager to watch television. She is about to reach for the remote
when she hears her parents say on their way out the door, 
“Laura, you should be good while we’re gone.”
Laura freezes as her parents exit. She desperately wants
to turn on the television, but she keeps thinking about her 
parents’ statement that she should be good. Perhaps it means 
that she can watch television; she usually does, after all. But 
her mind races to memories of those times in which she has 
overheard people criticize television, saying things like “too
much television rots your brain!” or “good kids don’t watch a
lot of television!” In light of those comments, Laura begins to
think that her parental authorities believe that watching 
television has deleterious effects and therefore is not “good.”
She then considers the fact that her parents said that she 
“should” be good. On the one hand, she thinks, this language
could indicate that being good is merely a suggestion and is,
therefore, optional. On the other hand, however, she
considers the possibility that her parents thought it
necessary to mention that she should be good to signal that
was treated with hostility by many who favored contextual or socio-legal
perspectives. The disdain was mutual. Recently, however, the mood has
changed.”). 
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they believe that she must be good, and they were using that
language in order to test just how profoundly she 
understands that she must be good. As a result, she
concludes that she is actually prohibited from watching
television. She sits quiet and frustrated on the couch until
her parents return at 10:30 p.m.
When her parents enter the room, they notice Laura’s 
frown and ask, “What’s wrong?” Laura responds, “I can’t 
believe that you wouldn’t let me watch television while you
were gone!” Her parents, of course, are perplexed and explain
that they never meant for her to forego television and that
she could even have watched beyond her 9:30 p.m. limit 
because it was such an unusual and special night.
Laura’s behavior might strike us as odd or unusual, even
self-defeating. This is because we generally assume that
norms constrain us from doing what we would have done in
their absence only when their content directs us that we 
cannot do that behavior. Here, a straightforward 
interpretation of the parents’ norm would indicate that it 
permits Laura to do the activity that she otherwise would 
have done, yet she concluded that the norm prohibited it. As
a result she refrained from doing it. The norm changed her.
Generally speaking, Norm Supercompliance occurs when
one is constrained by a norm despite the fact that it should
have been obvious that the norm could easily and permissibly
have been interpreted so that it would not constrain. 
Supercompliance is an example of superfluous constraint, at
least from a particular interpretive point of view.
B. The Mechanics of Norm Supercompliance 
Norm Supercompliance is a rather basic phenomenon. It
involves a small number of preconditions and affirmative
steps. In the central case,160 Supercompliance occurs when (1) 
160. By “central case,” I mean to borrow the meaning used by John Finnis. See 
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 277-78 (1980) (“Above all, the
meaning has been constructed as a focal meaning, not as an appropriation of the 
term ‘law’ in a univocal sense that would exclude from the reference of the term
anything that failed to have all the characteristics (and to their full extent) of the
central case. And, equally important, it has been fully recognized that each of the 





































 837 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
a person would freely choose to engage in ; (2) that person 
learns or is reminded of the existence of a soft norm that
regulates  and which, therefore, can be interpreted so as to 
permit ; (3) that person concludes that the norm governs his 
or her decision of whether to ; (4) yet, he or she interprets
the norm as requiring to not ; and (5) that person decides to
comply with the norm by refraining from . There may be
other ways for Supercompliance to happen,161 but when these
conditions are satisfied, it certainly has.  
Returning to our initial example, it should be apparent 
that Laura has met the conditions for Supercompliance.
Laura was about to watch television just before her parents
announced the norm that she should be good while they are
gone. A straightforward interpretation of that norm could 
lead one to believe that engaging in watching television, at
least until 9:30 p.m., was permissible. For one, she is
ordinarily able to do so. Additionally, the operator of the
norm, “should,” appears on a straightforward reading to
indicate that the norm was not mandatory but rather was
aspirational, meaning that acting contrary to the content of
the norm is permissible. Moreover, her parents would have
accepted the permissible interpretation of the norm for this 
scenario, at least for television watching between 7:00 p.m. 
and 9:30 p.m. Despite the availability of this interpretation, 
Laura concluded that she was bound by that norm 
authoritatively and, furthermore, concluded that it 
prohibited television watching. Considering herself bound,
Laura “complied” by refraining from watching television.
In the central case of Supercompliance, the actor is aware
of a norm and concludes that it bears in some way upon his
or her decisionmaking regarding an action. As a result, the
actor believes that he or she must engage in an act of
constraint—of self-sacrifice—despite the fact that a 
straightforward or otherwise obvious interpretation does not
obligate such sacrifice. That is, the person that is being
guided by the norm chooses an option that differs from that 
which that person would otherwise have chosen in the 
and a primary reference, and therefore extends to analogous and secondary 
instances which lack something of the central instance.”) (emphasis in original). 
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absence of the norm despite the fact that the norm does not 
obligate him or her to do so. 
It might be wondered why I am excluding motivational 
overdetermination—cases in which extrinsic reasons are 
sufficient to motivate the person to perform an action, such 
as when a person acts in perceived compliance with the norm
even though he or she would have performed the same action 
in the absence of the norm because of the pleasure that the 
action would bring. It is important to remember that capacity
for constraint is a critical normative feature of legality under
Raz/Shapiro exclusive positivism. Because I aim to show that 
soft law can produce constraint in instances of
Supercompliance, and because I have chosen to describe the
central case of Supercompliance rather than its outer limits, 
it makes sense to describe an example in which the soft norm
provides difference-making constraint. 
We can better understand Supercompliance by
considering for a moment what it is not. It is not expected 
obedience to a straightforward obligatory directive. Thus, it
is not deciding to stop swimming because a lifeguard has told 
you that everyone must leave a pool and you fear being
barred from the pool for disregarding the order. Nor is it an 
interpretation done for the sake of pursuing one’s own
interest. Thus, it is not deciding that the norm, “treat your
body like a temple,” means being able to dine regularly at
your favorite all-you-can-eat buffet on the reasoning that 
temples are sometimes places in which feasts are served. For 
that reason, it always presumes that one either would not be
sanctioned for engaging in the conduct that they would
otherwise have preferred to do or that the sanction for 
engaging in that conduct under the law is no worse than the 
sanction for doing so in the absence of the law. 
Likewise, it is also to be distinguished from strategic
decisionmaking in the shadow of uncertainty. There is a
wealth of behavioral literature on how people bargain
differently when the rewards from bargaining are uncertain. 
Scholars have recently tied this literature to the sort of 
uncertainty that occurs under legal standards.162 It is 
162. See Yuval Feldman & Shahar Lifshitz, Behind the Veil of Legal 
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important to distinguish Supercompliance from self-
interested conduct in the face of unknown probabilities
regarding rewards or punishments. To that end, I have 
included among the elements of Supercompliance that it
involve an act that one would not have performed in the 
absence of the norm and that the act be sacrificial in nature. 
Putting this all together, the central case of 
Supercompliance has three basic elements: (1) a soft norm;
(2) the conscious following of that norm; and (3) a sacrificial 
act done for the sake of following that norm that differs from
the act one would have performed in the absence of that 
norm. I will consider each component in turn.
1. The Norm is Soft 
One of the conditions of Norm Supercompliance is that
the norm upon which the person relies possesses at least one
of the traits of softness described above. Thus, so long as the
conditions for norm softness that concern the norm, itself, as
opposed to the softness that results from impotent
enforcement bodies are satisfied, then this aspect of Norm
Supercompliance is satisfied. 
2. The Subject Engages in Conscious Norm Following 
At risk of stating the obvious, one engaging in Norm
Supercompliance must, at the very least, be aware of the
norm and perceive that his or her conduct complies with it.
Without doing so, the phenomenon could not fairly be said to
be Norm Supercompliance.
To be clear, Supercompliers need not be conscious that 
there is a permissible interpretation that would permit them 
to do the act that they would otherwise prefer to do in the
we suggest a more dramatic change in the way people react to legal uncertainty
than has been argued for in the disjunction effect suggested by Tversky and Shafir
or the uncertainty effect suggested by Gneezy and his colleagues. More
specifically, we argue that legal ambiguity might cause people to undermine their
consideration for the law altogether and resort to alternative motivational
causes—their true preferences. Thus, our focus is not on how people make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, but rather how people might avoid 
taking legality of their actions into account and choose alternative paths of
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absence of the norm. In some cases, the Supercomplier is
conscious of the norm’s permissive interpretation and
nevertheless sincerely concludes that the norm obligates him
or her to engage in the sacrificial conduct. In other cases, the 
interpreter is not conscious of those qualities, perhaps as a
result of self-deception that functions to rationalize the
behavior. The person has interpreted the norm and is making
a conscious effort to follow its dictates.
In central cases of Supercompliance, one is 
motivationally guided by the norm. According to Shapiro, 
this happens “when his or her conformity [with a norm] is
motivated by the fact that the [norm] regulates the conduct
in question.”163 While I would not use the word “fact” as 
Shapiro does, I would say that the Norm Supercomplier is 
motivated by his or her perception that the norm regulates 
the conduct in question. 
Shapiro has argued that Hart’s rule of recognition 
requires officials to be motivationally guided by norms;
whereas it requires that ordinary citizens only be
epistemically guided by them. Epistemic guidance occurs 
“when the person learns of his legal obligations from the 
[norm] provided by those in authority and conforms to the 
[norm].”164 Perhaps, epistemic guidance can support an 
instance of Norm Supercompliance when it is performed by 
non-officials, but it falls short of being a central case.
Shapiro’s point brings to mind Meir Dan-Cohen’s 
distinction between decision and conduct norms. In a
landmark article, Dan-Cohen explained that, when an official
is applying a norm, the norm serves as a “decision” norm, and
when layperson is following a norm, it serves as a “conduct” 
norm.165 On Shapiro’s view, motivational guidance is needed 
when a norm is a decision norm, but only epistemic guidance 
is needed when a norm is a conduct norm. I will use these
categories to frame my discussion of the empirical literature
in later parts. 
163. Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, 4 LEGAL THEORY 469, 490 (1998).
 164. See Shapiro, Hart’s Way Out, supra note 151, at 173.
 165. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
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3. The Subject Performs An Act Which He or She Would 
Not Have Performed in the Absence of the Norm 
When Supercompliance occurs, the effort to follow the
norm in the previous condition manifests itself in an act that 
materially or practically differs from that which one would
have performed in the norm’s absence. To discuss practicality 
or materiality at length would belabor the point. We must
exclude the differences that are necessitated by the
hypothetical comparison, such as the fact that the act under 
the norm takes place after awareness of the norm whereas 
the act in its absence does not. Likewise, if the only difference 
between the act performed in the absence of the norm and 
following the norm is that one took place, say, minutes earlier 
than the other, then that difference does not likely satisfy the
requirements of materiality.
4. The Act Undertaken is Sacrificial 
Lastly, in the central case of Supercompliance, the act
undertaken to satisfy the perceived requirements of the norm 
is sacrificial compared to the act that would have been
performed in the absence of the norm.
Many economists will find this condition to be redundant
after the satisfaction of the third condition. Under the 
principle of revealed preference (widely accepted in consumer
economics) one’s choice among available alternatives is
assumed to reveal one’s preference for the thing chosen over 
those alternatives.166 Using this reasoning, one way to
determine whether an act is sacrificial is simply to compare 
the act under the norm to the alternative acts that the person 
could have chosen under the norm and ask whether the 
person would have chosen the alternative in the absence of
the norm. If the answer is yes, then, generally speaking, the
act performed in the absence of the norm is preferred, and 
166. Ariel Rubinstein & Yuval Salant, Some Thoughts on the Principle of
Revealed Preference, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE
ECONOMICS: A HANDBOOK 116, 117 (Andrew Caplin & Andrew Schotter eds., 2008)
(“The Principle of Revealed Preference, as we understand it, is a methodological
paradigm which follows the standard economic approach, whereby observed
choices are used only to reveal the mental preferences of the individual over the
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the decision to perform an alternative act must be sacrificial.
So the choice under the norm, if different from the choice in
the absence of the norm, sacrifices the act that they otherwise 
would have preferred to make.
Even if it risks superfluousness, I favor including
sacrifice as a separate condition for the central case of
Supercompliance because it emphasizes the experience of 
constraint and because there are certainly those who agree 
neither with the principle of revealed preference nor with the
notion that engaging in a non-preferred act is always
sacrificial.167 For the reasons relied upon by economists,
however, I suspect that, in most cases, when one foregoes an
action that she would otherwise have chosen to perform for 
the sake of complying with a norm, the norm-following act is
likely to involve greater sacrifice, using the typical meanings
of that word.168 
One final point: just as a Norm Supercomplier need not
be conscious of the permissive interpretation, he or she need
not be conscious of the fact that the act is sacrificial. Indeed, 
he or she might be convinced that the sacrificial act is the
most self-interested course of conduct despite the fact that
167. For those unsatisfied with the logic of revealed preference, there might be
some concern that if a norm is soft solely as a result of a specification problem
and that norm is backed up by a sanction or a reward—a somewhat narrow class
of soft norms—then a risk-averse person might be inclined to conclude that the
best way to approach the norm is to interpret it conservatively, leading them to
constrain themselves from engaging in a wide range of behavior that they
otherwise would have engaged in. Those individuals have not internalized the law 
as imposing an obligation upon them and are seeking to avoid sanction. So if a 
sanction and norm content operate together to change the utility of an action by
altering the probability of something good or bad happening to that person, and
the person to that norm acts self-interestedly in light of his or her perception of
that changed probability, it is arguably not a case of Supercompliance. Similar
phenomena have been the focal point of behavioral research. See Feldman & 
Lifshitz, supra note 162, at 145 (“The goal was to compare between the influence
of certain, probabilistic, and ambiguous legal benefits relative to a situation where 
no legal benefit was offered.”) (emphasis added). Of course, this is a rather narrow
concern because it is a concern under conduct rules rather than decision rules,
which have lower standards for guidance, as I describe in Part III.A.
168. Because it is likely a rare instance in which the sacrifice condition does
much work in excluding cases of Norm Supercompliance, we need not spill much
ink on articulating a set of conditions to determine whether an act is sacrificial. I 
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the choice would have been different absent the norm. Again, 
this might be a result of self-deception.  
IV. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE 
Having now described the elements of Norm
Supercompliance in some detail, we are ready to turn to the
hard question of whether it is plausible. Though the story of 
Laura might seem entirely believable to some, others might
continue to believe that it is an outlandish tale, describing
something that could not really happen under soft norms.
Another objection is that the Laura example is plausible in
that non-legal context, but it would be implausible in a legal
context. Answering these objections and establishing the
plausibility of Supercompliance goes a long way towards
resolving the status problem for soft law in favor of legality,
as it casts doubt on its particular exclusive positivist 
foundation. It does not eliminate skepticism, of course. There
might remain some who concede its plausibility but maintain
that the frequency or impact of Supercompliance is so low
compared to constraint under hard norms that there is still 
reason to believe that only hard law deserves legal status.
While this latter concern is not my focus, I will address it 
where the empirical evidence is germane.
To make the case for plausibility, I will rely on the results 
from experimental scientific studies, including my own. It
might be wondered why we ought to resort to such studies,
many of which involve simulations, when there are plenty of 
real-world soft laws to use as examples. The problem with
existing soft laws is that it is difficult to determine what 
would have occurred in the absence of an existing soft law. It
is almost impossible to find examples in which soft and hard 
norms have separately regulated identical circumstances 
(such as the same parties, the same underlying facts, all 
during the same time period) or to determine with confidence 
what a subject’s behavior would have been in the absence of
any dispositive norm at all. Experimental simulation can
provide control of the circumstances of norm application,
making legal norms, case facts, incentives, legal precedent,
and party argumentation uniform or different depending on 
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Importantly, my goal here is not to defend the 
generalizability of the results in these experiments; to the 
contrary, I rely on these studies primarily to illustrate the
plausibility of the phenomenon in any instance. It is an
attempt to provide recalcitrant empirical evidence to unseat 
a conceptual assumption about legal norms that has been
accepted by a community of international legal scholars and, 
to a lesser extent, legal philosophers.169 
A. Supercompliance under Decision Norms: An Example of 
Adjudication 
In a recent study, Andrew Moshirnia and I used 
behavioral experimentation to shed light on whether a hard 
norm (a rule170) or a kind of soft norm (a standard171) was more
likely to keep judges from choosing the same outcome that 
they would have chosen in an identical case but under the
absence of those norms.172 Each subject—either a recent law
graduate or a law student—was asked to act as a judge in a
simulated, ideologically divisive asylum case.173 In a nutshell,
the case forced judges to decide whether to grant asylum to a
politically persecuted immigrant who had overstayed his
visa.174 Among the reasons in favor of asylum were that the 
applicant had a meritorious case that he would face political
persecution upon return to his home country, that he does 
not appear to pose a threat to the safety of Americans, and 
that he is engaged in gainful employment.175 Among the
reasons in favor of denial were that he stayed a long time
after his visa expired, that he did not pay taxes on his income, 
169. See, e.g., Douglas J. Mook, In Defense of External Invalidity, 38 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 379, 381-82 (1983) (discussing four reasons why not to do an
experiment: “First, we may be asking whether something can happen, rather than
whether it typically does happen.”).
 170. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
 171. See supra Part I.B.2.b. 
172. Sheppard & Moshirnia, supra note 32, at 545. 
173. Id. at 559.
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and that asylum might not be the best policy for the United 
States.176 
The experiment had two phases. In one phase, subjects
were able to decide whether to grant asylum without the
assistance of any law on the issue (the baseline phase).177 We 
designed this phase to indicate the subjects’ understanding
of the best direction in which to resolve the case on the
balance of reasons as they saw them. In the other phase, 
subjects received the same fact pattern but with the addition
of either a rule or a standard that purported to govern
whether asylum ought to be granted (the law phase).178 The 
rule quite clearly forbade the immigrant from applying for
asylum because he had waited beyond a six-month grace 
period, stating, “Aliens seeking asylum must file their 
petitions within 6 months after the day upon which their
work visas expire.”179 The standard stated, “Aliens seeking
asylum must file their petitions within a reasonable time
after the day upon which their work visas expire.”180 Subjects
were to assume that the rule or standard came from the
recognized legal authority of their jurisdiction.181 The order in
which subjects received the phases was randomized; that is,
some had the baseline first (normal order), and some had the
law condition first (reverse order).182 
In each phase, subjects were told to write an opinion
justifying their decisions.183 They were further told that, if
they were to be eligible for a large cash prize, their opinions 
would have to satisfy two reviewers that their decisions were
adequately justified. In order to illustrate to the subjects that
their decisions had real-world consequences, winning the
176. Id.
 177. Id. at 561-62.
 178. Id.
 179. Id. at 597.
 180. Id. at 598. 
181. Id. at 595. The study additionally varied whether subjects were exposed to
legal argument during the law phase, but that variable is not particularly
important for present purposes. 
182. Id. at 561.
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prize also resulted in a large donation to a pro-asylum
organization or anti-immigration organization, depending on 
whether they decided to grant or deny asylum in each 
phase.184 
Because the study was most interested in constraint 
under norms, we analyzed only those subjects that granted
asylum in the baseline, meaning that we analyzed only those
subjects that had the potential to be constrained by the 
norms in the law phase. Incidentally, the vast majority of 
subjects chose to grant asylum in the baseline phase.
The most interesting results for our purposes here are 
those concerning constraints under the soft norm. Taking all 
subjects together, ten percent of subjects under the soft norm
were constrained by it, meaning that they decided not to 
grant asylum, even though they had done so in the absence
of the norm.185 In other words, even though the soft norm
appeared to leave the way clear for subjects to decide the case 
in the same way that they decided the case in the absence of 
the norm, they chose to reach a different result under the soft
norm. This result was surprising, but it did not reach 
statistical significance. Considering only the subjects who 
had experienced the baseline phase before experiencing the
law phase weeks later, however, the percentage constrained 
jumped to nineteen percent, which was statistically
significant.186 Considering that we expected these numbers to 
be zero, the results were quite striking. We might further 
want to know how the standard compared with the rule.
Taking all subjects together, the rule constrained twenty-one 
percent of subjects, and this number jumped to forty-two
percent when considering only normal order subjects.187 
184. Id. at 560-61.
 185. Id. at 570.
 186. See id. at 584; Brian Sheppard, Rules vs. Standards, Naturalized: Using 
Philosophy and Behavioral Experimentation to Identify the Determinants of
Constraint in a Legal Context, 270 (May 2012) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation,
Harvard Law School) (on file with Harvard Law School Law Library, Harvard 
Law School) (discussing significance). 
187. Lending support to this empirical finding is the fact that there appeared to
be similar, although not statistically significant, levels of constraint under the
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 847 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
The question remains whether the constraint under the
standard constitutes Supercompliance. It does. At the outset, 
the claim that the legal standard is soft must be defended.
The criterion for legal validity here was a reasonableness 
test. Such standards are popularly understood to be vague,188 
particularly when interpreted without the assistance of
clarifying precedent, as was the case here. Moreover, many 
have characterized that criterion of “reasonableness” as a
moral standard,189 including Shapiro.190 As a result, both
varied the amount of time to adjudicate rather than exposure to legal argument.
See Brian Sheppard, Judging Under Pressure: A Behavioral Examination of the
Relationship Between Legal Decisionmaking and Time, 39 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 931,
955-56 (2012). About seven percent of subjects were constrained under the soft
law; whereas about twenty-seven percent of the subjects were constrained under
the hard law. Id. at 980. Breaking this down into each subject group, none of the
subjects under the standard who had unlimited time to decide their case were
constrained, although eleven percent of the subjects under the standard with
limited time were. For the rule, the levels of constraint were twenty-five percent 
and thirty-two percent, respectively. Id. The amount of constraint under the
standard did not reach significance compared to the baseline for either of the
subject groups, although that was also true for the rule subjects that were not
subject to time limitation. The rule subjects under time limitation, however, did 
show statistically significant levels of constraint. Id. at 983. 
188. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 145 (2002); Curtis Bridgeman, Why
Contracts Scholars Should Read Legal Philosophy: Positivism, Formalism, and
the Specification of Rules in Contract Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1479 (2008); 
Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 4 (1999).
 189. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99
(1907); David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 GA. L. REV. 703, 724 (1992); Stephen J.
Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
444 (2004); Charles Weijer, I Need a Placebo Like I Need a Hole in the Head, 30 
J.L. MED. &  ETHICS 69, 70 (2002); Ronald Dworkin, Thirty Years On, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1655, 1676 (2002) (reviewing COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 78); David
Howarth, “O Madness of Discourse, That Cause Sets Up with and Against Itself!,” 
96 YALE L.J. 1389, 1415 (1987) (reviewing H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, 
CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1985)); Jeremy Waldron, Planning for Legality, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 883, 895 (2011) (reviewing SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2010)). 
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specificity and duplication problems are implicated.191 
In addition, the subjects engaged in a sacrificial act that
was materially different from the act they would have
performed in the absence of the law. Even though they would 
have preferred to grant asylum, as indicated by their baseline
decisions, they nevertheless chose during the law phase to
deny asylum, resulting in a donation to an organization that
is hostile to the position they preferred to take in the absence 
of the law. 
Lastly, it appears that subjects were consciously
following those norms and motivationally guided by them.
Beyond the fact that the introduction of the soft norm was 
one of the only salient changes in the scenario between the
baseline and law phases, subjects often cited the soft law in
their opinions as part of the justification for their decisions. 
B. Supercompliance Under Conduct Norms 
In recent years, a group of psychologists has focused its 
attention on the systematic study of cheating and other
similarly self-serving conduct that is often in violation of
social or legal norms. A handful of studies in this literature
have analyzed the impact that norms have on cheating, with
some comparing the effect of a soft norm to the absence of a
posited norm and others comparing the effects of soft norms
to the effects of hard norms.
191. At least arguably, there is a regulator-based softness issue as well—in 
particular, the weakness of the sanction imposed. The only official sanction that
existed was the inability to be considered for a lottery. Making this sanction even
weaker was the fact that it would occur only if a neutral reviewer found a subject’s
analysis unconvincing in either phase. Admittedly, this mirrors real-world
adjudication somewhat, where the only personal penalty for unconvincing
adjudication is reversal and, potentially, a slight reduction in the likelihood for
career advancement. One difference, however, is that the sanction for these
subjects was no greater under the standard than when there was no law at all,
meaning that the sanction here did not increase the risk of suffering an evil, as it
ordinarily does. Since subjects defended granting asylum in the baseline phase,
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 849 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
Psychologists Nina Mazar, On Amir, and Dan Ariely
recently published a landmark study that provides great
insight into an underappreciated feature of soft norms.192 One
of their objectives was to determine the degree to which
references to moral norms, they call them “moral 
reminders,”193 influence the likelihood that one will cheat. In
particular, they hypothesized that people are generally
willing to cheat to the extent that they can enrich themselves 
without threatening their own positive self-view.
a. The Ten Commandments Experiment. In one study,
they sought to learn whether the salience of moral norms to
a subject impacts the likelihood that the subject will cheat,
figuring that salient moral norms will make it more difficult
for a subject to believe that he or she can cheat (or cheat a
lot) and continue to hold the belief that they have integrity.
They reasoned that the more salient the moral norm, the 
more a subject will be forced to re-evaluate her or his self-
image through the lens of morality.194 
The study had 229 subjects (students at two elite
universities) in two groups.195 Subjects in one group were
asked to write down the names of ten books that they had 
read in high school (the “no moral reminder” group), and 
subjects in the other group were asked to list any of the Ten 
Commandments that they could remember (the “moral 
reminder” group).196 The experimenters asked the individuals 
in the moral reminder group to make the list regardless of 
whether they believed in God or were part of a religion in
which the Ten Commandments were given special
significance.197 Thereafter, both groups were asked to perform
192. See Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of Honest People:
A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633, 633 (2008)
(discussing the study generally).
 193. Id. at 635.
 194. See id. at 633-34.
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a task seemingly unrelated to the first: they were given a
series of moderately difficult problems involving addition
that left the possibility for error, and they were asked to write
on a separate sheet the total number of correctly solved
problems.198 As part of the instructions, the experimenters
promised that two randomly selected participants would
earn ten dollars for every correct solution.199 
In addition to varying exposure to a moral reminder, the
experimenters also varied whether the subjects could
cheat.200 In the control condition, the subjects were asked to 
provide the worksheet upon which they wrote their answers 
so that the reported number of solutions could be verified.201 
In the experimental condition (or “cheat condition”) the 
subjects were able to keep their worksheet, giving them the 
opportunity to misreport the number of correct answers with
impunity.202 
For the control condition, the type of reminder had no
effect on whether the subjects cheated.203 But in the cheat 
condition, cheating occurred under the no reminder task but 
not under the moral reminder task.204 The experimenters
determined this from looking at the mean reported scores
under each condition.205 They found a significant interaction
between the presence of moral reminder and the presence of
moral reminder and the opportunity to cheat.206 That is, the
combination of a lack of moral reminder mattered when given
the opportunity to cheat but not when there was no such
198. Id. at 635-36.
 199. Id. at 636.
 200. Id.
 201. Id.
 202. Id. 
203. The mean scores for moral reminder/control and no reminder/control
groups was 3.1. (F(1, 225) = .012, p = .91). Id. at 636.
204. The mean score for the no reminder/cheat group was 4.2, and the mean 
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opportunity.207 The mean score in the no reminder/cheat
group was significantly higher than the scores in the moral 
reminder/cheat condition.208 
Interestingly, the participants remembered on average
only 4.3 of the Ten Commandments, and there was no
significant correlation between the number of
Commandments recalled and the number of problems the 
participants reported to have solved.209 The experimenters
noted: 
If we use the number of commandments remembered as a proxy for 
religiosity, the lack of relationship between religiosity and
magnitude of dishonesty suggest that the efficacy of the Ten 
Commandments is based on increased attention to one’s internal
honesty standards, leading to a lower tolerance for dishonesty (i.e.,
decreased self-concept maintenance threshold).210 
b. The Honor Code Experiment. In another experiment 
that formed part of the same study, the experimenters asked
their subjects—207 students attending either MIT or Yale—
to sign a statement about honesty.211 Specifically, the 
statement asked them to print and sign their names below
the statement, “I understand that this short survey falls 
under MIT’s [Yale’s] honor system.”212 Neither MIT nor Yale 
has an honor code system.213 In addition, this second 
experiment added independent variables manipulating the
amount earned per correctly solved problem: $.50 (“low
money”) and $2 (“high money”), paid to each participant.214 In
207. The mean scores were indistinguishable between the control conditions,
providing a reliable measure of the score that was likely without cheating (both
groups scored 3.1). Importantly, the mean score for subjects in the moral
reminder/cheat group (2.8) was indistinguishable from the scores in the control
condition, indicating a lack of cheating. Id. (F(1, 225) = .49, p = .48).
 208. “(MBooks/recycle = 4.2), but they did not cheat after the Ten Commandments
recall task (MTen Commandments/recycle = 2.8; F(1, 225) = 5.24, p = .023.) . . . .” Id.
 209. Id.
 210. Id.
 211. Id. at 636-37.
 212. Id. at 637. 
213. Id.
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this experiment, however, there was no control condition in 
which the subjects were given no opportunity to cheat while
being exposed to the moral reminder; rather, the two control 
conditions varied the money levels without presenting
subjects with an Honor Code or an opportunity to cheat.215 
The results mirrored those of the first experiment. The
Honor Code condition, which under the circumstances served 
as little more than a reminder of morality in general, was
enough to eliminate cheating just as the Ten Commandments
task had done.216 In particular, the mean scores were
indistinguishable between the control conditions in which
there was no opportunity to cheat and the moral reminder 
conditions in which cheating opportunities were available.217 
Moreover, the mean scores were significantly higher under 
the no reminder/cheat conditions than under the moral 
reminder conditions in which cheating opportunities were
available.218 Lastly, the presence or absence of the Honor 
Code condition was highly significant with the variance in
the mean scores, whereas the presence or absence of the low
or high money condition was not.219 That is, the moral 
reminder appears to have had a more powerful impact on 
whether there was cheating than the amount of gain from 
cheating did.
c. Are the Non-Cheaters Supercompliers? As a threshold 
matter, we must determine whether the norms to which the 
participants in these studies were subject were soft.
Beginning with the Ten Commandments experiment, the
norms that the experimenters directed the subjects to think 
about have regulator-based softness. There did not exist a
215. Id. 
216. Id.
 217. Id. (Control Conditions: low money = 3.4 & high money = 3.2, averaged to
3.3; Moral Reminder Conditions: low money = 3.1 & high money = 3.0, averaged
to 3.0 (F(1, 201) = .19, p = .66)).
 218. Id. (No Reminder/Cheat: low money=6.1 & high money=5.0, averaged to
5.5; F(1, 201) = 19.69, p < .001).
 219. Id. (“An overall analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a highly significant
effect of the attention-to-standards manipulation (F(2, 201) = 11.94, p < .001), no
significant effect of the level of incentive manipulation (F(1, 201) = .99, p = .32), 
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social rule whereby the Ten Commandments, themselves, are 
taken as a social system that creates true obligations under 
a social rule. Furthermore, there is no earthly sanction for
violation of the Ten Commandments, themselves. While
some might object that God could be monitoring compliance
with the Ten Commandments, the results suggest that the
subjects were not devout and therefore did not expect that 
this would be the case.220 Moreover, devoutness was not 
conventional in the region in which the experiment took 
place. Despite being elite students, they could only recall 
about four of the Ten Commandments. In addition, the 
experimenters conducted a survey of laypeople who had not
taken part in the experiment but were told about the
experiment’s structures, and those surveyed predicted on
average that the Ten Commandments would not significantly
decrease cheating.
As to norm-based softness, the Commandments are a
mixed bag. We cannot be sure which of the Commandments 
the subjects were able to recall in each instance, but it is
entirely possible that the subjects were not able to write
down any that would later be relevant to the task. Indeed, 
the mandates to keep holy the Sabbath and honor fathers and 
mothers, as well as the prohibitions of coveting, adultery,
making graven images, putting other gods before God, taking
God’s name in vain, and killing are not straightforwardly
applicable to the task that they were asked to do.221 To be 
sure, there are two Commandments that are possibly
relevant on a straightforward reading—specifically, the
prohibitions against stealing and bearing false witness 
against neighbors.222 It ought to be conceded that the content
in these two norms is well-drawn enough to avoid general 
specificity problems. Moreover, they arguably do not
duplicate a moral mandate that they were, by necessity,
already subject to. 
Turning now to the Honor Code experiment, the basis for 
softness is reversed: the case for content-based softness is 
220. See id. at 636.
 221. Exodus 20:3-20:17 (King James).
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strong and the case for regulator-based softness is relatively
weak. Though the statement was not phrased as a norm, it
ought to be understood as such; “I understand that this short
survey falls under MIT’s [Yale’s] honor system.”223 Because
there is not actually an honor system at these universities,
the norm’s directive does not lead to another obligation, let
alone a specific one. In a sense, it is a broken normative 
system, leading to a dead end—the most severe kind of
specificity problem one can encounter. The students were not 
rudderless, however, as they still had a norm directing them 
to follow an “honor” code, which they could reasonably
assume required them to behave honorably when they
performed an experiment. This too lacks specificity, however,
making it fair to characterize it as a standard. Moreover,
insofar as we are willing to say that a norm requiring “honor”
is a generic moral test (such as if we required “morality”),
then we have a duplication problem according to positivist
reasoning.
As to regulator-based considerations, it is at least
arguable that a norm is enforced by a hard source.
University-student relations are governed by contract law.224 
And Honor Codes ordinarily form a part of the university-
student contract.225 Since the American court system enforces
contract law, the enforcement of the Honor Code rests on the 
same social convention that undergirds the enforcement of
American law. Furthermore, university honor codes are
ordinarily backed up with sanctions such as expulsion.226 
While all of this supports a finding of hardness, we should 
223. Mazar et al., supra note 192, at 637.
 224. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416, (7th Cir. 1992) (“It is
held generally in the United States that the ‘basic legal relation between a
student and a private university or college is contractual in nature.’”) (quoting
Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1972)); Doherty v. S. Coll. of
Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 577 (6th Cir. 1988); Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Hughes,
765 So. 2d 528, 535 (Miss. 2000).
 225. See, e.g., Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, 438 Fed. App’x 381, 384 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“Because this action involves an Honor Code dispute between a university and
its student, contractual theories underlie our analysis.”) (citing Behrend v. State,
379 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Ohio 1977)).
 226. See Eric Roberts, Honor Codes Across the Country, http://www-cs-
faculty.stanford.edu/~eroberts/cs181/projects/honor-code/honorcodes.html (last






























 855 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
not overlook that neither of the schools that the subjects 
attended had honor codes. There is a distinct possibility that
the subjects were aware of their absence and, therefore, did 
not accept that the norm set forth a new contractual 
obligation that they needed to observe. The experiment did 
not make it clear whether this had occurred, however.  
Having presented the case for softness, we can now turn 
to other dimensions of Supercompliance. For both
experiments, we can infer that some proportion of non-
cheating subjects engaged in an act that they otherwise 
would not have in the absence of the norm—namely, not
cheating. The increase in the number of “correct” answers in 
the non-norm cheat conditions lends strong empirical 
support to the notion that some subjects would have decided 
to cheat (or cheat to a greater extent) in the cheat condition 
had they not been exposed to the moral reminder. 
Furthermore, foregoing the opportunity to win more money 
in the lottery is sacrificial.  
The difficult question to answer is whether the subjects
were engaged in conscious norm following. One reason to
suspect that such consciousness did not occur is the fact that
the direct relevance of the Ten Commandments and non-
existent Honor Codes to the conduct at hand was not obvious,
particularly among non-believers. We cannot rule out the 
possibility that the subjects were conscious and motivated to
be bound by the posited soft norms, believing that they stated
obligations, even if it seems unlikely. Of course, Shapiro and 
his exclusive positivist followers do not require that conduct
norms such as these motivationally guide; rather, they must 
epistemically guide.227 The level of consciousness that a
subject must have to be epistemically guided is clear. Shapiro
indicates that “[c]entral to epistemic guidance is the fact that 
the rule was the source of information regarding what counts 
as conformity, not necessarily the source of motivation for
conformity,”228 and there is no reason to suspect that this
process cannot occur subconsciously. If so, then, on some 
cognitive level, the norm caused subjects to engage in a
sacrificial act that was consistent with the directives to which
227. Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Morality, and the Guidance of Conduct, 6 LEGAL
THEORY 127, 146 (2000).
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they were exposed, then they should satisfy the requirement 
of epistemic guidance. While these experiments cannot prove 
causality, they provide evidence that the soft norm caused 
the difference in behavior described and, in turn, provide
support for epistemic guidance.
Considering these factors together, it is fair to say that 
the cheating resistance among the subjects that would
otherwise have cheated falls somewhere within the orbit of 
Norm Supercompliance, falling just short, perhaps, of being
a central case. It is close enough, I believe, to justify
concluding that epistemic guidance under these
circumstances is plausible and, therefore, that 
Supercompliance can occur. 
2. Soft Norms Versus Hard Norms 
We can also learn about the power of soft norms by 
comparing them to hard norms under identical 
circumstances. Unsurprisingly, the hard law was more
constraining than the soft law in my aforementioned judging
experiment.229 And other empirical studies have observed a 
similar differential in constraining power. For instance, 
Professors Yuval Feldman and Alon Harel used behavioral 
experimentation to analyze whether rules or standards were 
more effective at preventing people from following self-
interested (and arguably immoral) social norms that
conflicted with law.230 As soft law skeptics would expect: 
Standards g[a]ve people the opportunity to interpret reality in a
way that supports their self-interest and hence both noncompliance 
[social] norms (most people would convince the client) and high 
[incentives] (if you convince the client you will earn a lot) exert a 
greater effect when people are faced with [standards].231 
Some might look at this evidence and conclude that, even if 
it must be conceded that soft norms can constrain, they never
229. Subjects in the rule groups showed significantly higher rates of constraint:
10% for those under standards versus a 21.5% increase for those under rules,
looking at all subjects. See Sheppard & Moshirnia, supra note 32, at 571. 
230. Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity 
of Legal Norms: An Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 
REV. L. & ECON. 81, 81 (2008). 
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constrain as powerfully as hard norms. As a result, they
might argue, soft law does not deserve legal status. While any
such distinction risks arbitrariness—there is no obvious
place to set a minimum level of constraint—another problem 
with making that distinction is that it rests on assumptions 
that are not yet established. More important for the purposes 
of this Article is whether the standards do anything, not that
they outperform rules as constraints. Interestingly, however,
when standards do outperform rules, then drawing the line
of demarcation for legality between hard and soft norms
becomes untenable, insofar as it is based on the notion the
soft norms are incapable of performing law’s beneficial 
service. The following study provides an example. 
a. The Tabloid Study. In a very recent study, a group of 
researchers sought to see how various normative
interventions affect the likelihood that people will engage in
sacrificial, honest behavior.232 The researchers tested
whether subjects would forego the financial benefits of taking
a tabloid newspaper without paying for it.233 The researchers
placed hundreds of sale booths on various streets.234 Each
booth had a large plastic board sign, a bag with the tabloids,
and a box in which one could leave payment.235 The price of
the paper was indicated on the payment box. The
experimenters designed the booth so that people could take
tabloids quite easily without payment or with
underpayment—as well as allowing them to pay the full 
amount or more.236 In the control, only the cost of the
newspaper was shown (“The paper costs €0.60.”).237 There
were two treatment conditions: a “legal” treatment, in which
they added, “Stealing a paper is illegal;” and a “moral”
treatment, in which they added, “Thank you for being 
232. Gerald J. Pruckner & Rupert Sausgruber, Honesty on the Streets: A Field 
Study on Newspaper Purchasing, 11 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 661, 661-62 (2013).
 233. Id. at 662.
 234. Id. at 663.
 235. Id. at 664.
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honest.”238 Theft of a newspaper is illegal in Austria, and it is 
governed by a mandatory legal rule.239 The researchers
randomized the locations of each condition over the course of
several days.240 
Many people were honest and paid the stated amount of
€0.60, but most did not.241 The experimenters observed 120
instances in which the paper was removed from the bag, and
in forty-one cases, a positive payment was recorded.242 There
was no significant difference between any of the conditions 
as to the percentage of non-payers between any of the
conditions—legal, moral, and control—as to the percentage 
of payers.243 More importantly for our purposes, however, was
that the total amount of payment among those who paid any
amount was highest under the moral condition, a soft social
norm. The control (€0.16) and legal (€0.15) conditions
produced similar levels of giving, but the giving under the
moral condition (€0.38) was statistically significant.244 Thus,
the presence of moral treatment did not correlate with an
increase in the likelihood of payment, but it did correlate with
an increase in the amount that people were willing to pay
when they paid at all.245 This difference was driven primarily
from the fact that nearly half of the subjects under the moral 
condition were compliant, honest payers—that is, they paid 
at least the €0.60 cost of the newspaper—whereas no subjects
under the legal condition did, and less than ten percent did 
under the control.
b. Are The Honest Payers Supercompliers? At the
outset, we must consider whether the experiment used soft
norms. The moral treatment, “[t]hank you for being honest”
can reasonably be recast in the format of a facially soft norm
statement, the most appropriate being the aspirational norm 
238. Id.
 239. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [Penal Code] § 242(1) (Austria), available at 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/StGB.htm#242.
240. Pruckner & Sausgruber, supra note 232, at 666.
 241. Id. at 669.
 242. Id. at 663, 668. 
243. Id.
 244. Id. at 669-71.
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“you ought to be honest.” That is, honesty is supererogatory
rather than mandatory. Just as easily, the legal treatment
can reasonably be recast as a hard norm. “Stealing a paper is 
illegal,” is tantamount to saying that “you may not take this
paper without paying the posted price else you will be subject
to the penalties set forth in the law.” The laws of Austria are 
authoritative pursuant to a social rule and are backed up by
sanctions. Moreover, the norm is mandatory and stated with
specificity to identify a clear obligation. The legal treatment
is, therefore, classifiable as a hard norm. Put differently, it is
reasonable to assume that, had the treatments been phrased 
as these norm statements, the results of the experiment
would not have been different.
The subjects who complied also engaged in sacrificial acts 
under the soft norm that they would not have in the absence 
of that norm. Because the percentage of compliers under the
moral treatment was so much higher than under the control,
we can assume that some proportion of compliers would not 
have paid the cost of the paper in the absence of the soft
norm. Moreover, the act of parting with money was
sacrificial. While the experimenters did not test whether the
people were conscious of the soft norm, its salience in the
environment, the short time between exposure and payment,
and the differences in amounts paid suggest that they were
both aware of them and were motivated to pay the amounts 
that they did because of them.
Some might object that the study took place in an
environment that was already being regulated by a hard
norm prohibiting theft—Austrian criminal law—so the
results ought to be dismissed on the ground that we are
simply comparing hard norm (in the control condition and
law treatment) against hard law plus soft law (in the moral
treatment). But that would be a mistake. While the law
operated in the background, so too did a soft norm—the moral 
rule prohibiting theft. Moreover, these background norms
were present for all phases, making the positing of either the 
hard or soft norm the critical change in their environment. 
Thus, it is fair to say that the soft norm was more effective in
promoting compliance than either the hard norm or the
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While the phrasing of the norms and the applicability of
real-world background norms complicate our
characterization somewhat, the conduct of the honest payers 
bears at least a family resemblance to Norm 
Supercompliance. Close enough, I would argue, that it lends 
support to the plausibility of purer examples of the
phenomenon, which are denied under the positivist soft law
account. 
V. EXPLAINING AND DEFENDING NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE 
Having established the plausibility of Supercompliance 
under both decision and conduct norms, we can now turn to
an analysis of what is happening when it occurs. I will 
describe how Supercompliance satisfies the demands of law’s 
essential service along phenomenological and functional 
lines.246 Thus, I will employ psychological, conceptual, and 
logical techniques with the aim of showing how there may be
multiple deliberative processes at play during 
Supercompliance, any one of which can serve the functions 
that are required to make obedience to the norm rational.247 
A. Soft Norms Can Force Adjustment in the Scope of 
Considerable Reasons and Change Deliberation 
Considering first my judging experiment, it is important
to offer an explanation as to how the subject, when first
 246. CRISTINA REDONDO, REASONS FOR ACTION AND THE LAW 116-17 n.52 (1999)
(“Raz invokes two kinds of arguments, one phenomenological, the other one
functional. Phenomenological arguments point towards the particular features of
a concept (in this case, that of an exclusionary reason), based on how it functions
in an individual’s speaking and thinking. . . . Through the functional argument,
Raz shows how exclusionary reasons play an important role in practical reasoning
when a decision must be made.”).
 247. See David Woodruff Smith, Phenomenology, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (20), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/phenomenology (last
updated Winter 2013) (“It develops a descriptive or analytic psychology in that it 
describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or experience, in short,
acts of consciousness. Yet it develops a kind of logic—a theory of meaning (today
we say logical semantics)—in that it describes and analyzes objective contents of
consciousness: ideas, concepts, images, propositions, in short, ideal meanings of
various types that serve as intentional contents, or noematic meanings, of various
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exposed to the fact pattern, decided that asylum was
appropriate but when faced with the same fact pattern at a
later date and with the addition of a norm asserting a soft 
filing deadline decided to deny asylum.
In the first adjudication, the subject, acting as a judge,
considered all of the facts and issued an unfettered moral 
determination—a determination on the balance of reasons
regarding the best outcome.248 The subject believed that both
sides of the scale were accorded some weight, but the balance
of reasons tilted in favor of granting asylum.
In the second adjudication, the subject considered for the
first time the soft norm that “Aliens must file for asylum
within a reasonable amount of time after the day upon which 
their work visas expire.”249 The subject had already
internalized that the law states authoritative obligations, so
he or she was willing to do whatever the law told him or her 
to do. He or she read this norm, and while it was unclear what
reasonable might mean, it was clear that the norm placed 
great importance on the timing of the asylum application.
Even if it is true that what is reasonable is that which is right
on the balance of all reasons, the subject might have
concluded that she is to look only at what is reasonable with
respect to the timing of the asylum application. Thus, to put 
this in Razian terms, the norm excluded reasons that were
unrelated to timing during the first adjudication, but it left 
the balance of reasons related to the timing untouched. This
narrowed class of reasons favored denial, and therefore the
subject concluded that denial was mandated on the balance
of the remaining reasons despite the fact that the subject did 
not agree that denying asylum was the right thing to do on 
the balance of all reasons. 
The norm accomplished its deliberative work by
narrowing the scope of reasons that escape exclusion from 
the subject’s deliberation, which is slightly different from the 
account that Raz offers. Raz’s model says law excludes within
248. See supra Part IV.A. 
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the scope of the norm just as this one did,250 but it also adds 
that the person must consider the weight of a protected
reason consisting of the content of the law’s directive.
Because the law’s directive is not obvious to the subject, she
must come up with the balance on her own. As a consequence, 
the protected reason, if it exists at all, is vacuous, so it is the 
exclusion that makes the practical difference. Still, the soft 
law succeeded in stacking the deck in favor of denying
asylum through deliberative manipulation, just like a hard 
law aims to do. 
Because my account dispenses with a role for the 
protected reason to play (although it does not necessarily
dispense of protected reasons), Raz might object that this
account of Supercompliance does not meet the very particular
requirements of rational norm guidance under legal
authority that he requires. There are both reasons to doubt 
whether he would object on these grounds and whether the
objection is warranted. As to the former, Raz has recently 
clarified that “there is no need to saddle the account of
authority with a commitment to [the protected reason model]
of explaining the preemptiveness of authoritative
directives.”251 As to the latter, there is a new wave of analytic 
legal philosophers claiming that Raz’s account of protected 
reasons fails as a necessary condition for the occurrence legal
obligation. In separate articles, Christopher Essert and 
David Enoch assert that protected reasons are inessential or 
wrong. Essert argues that Raz’s various accounts of protected
reasons are unacceptable as an account of deliberation under
authoritative norms because they either force us not to
consider reasons in favor of the action that we are directed to 
perform or force us to double count those reasons.252 As a 
result, they do not make sense as a means of deliberating to
the right decision and do not comport with our experience of
250. We might say that this also differs in that the legislator leaves some
background reasons for the subject to balance—those concerning the evaluative
standard (in this case, the reasonableness of timing). But this seems like an
unnecessary distinction; we can simply say that the reasons left to consider are 
not among the background reasons.  
251. Joseph Raz, On Respect, Authority, and Neutrality: A Response, 120 ETHICS 
279, 298 (2010). 
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deliberation. More important for our present purposes is
Enoch’s criticism. Enoch describes a phenomenon—the case
of an authority issuing “Quasi-Protected Reasons”—that 
parallels in important respects the account of 
Supercompliance that I just described. Enoch points out that
Raz’s account of deliberation under an authority is unduly
narrow. There are multiple ways for deliberation under an
authoritative directive to operate, all of which benefit the
deliberator who agrees to be subject to the authority and are
satisfactory phenomenological accounts: 
Quasi-protected reasons come in different kinds: They include
(except for the relevant first-order reasons) reasons not to consider
other reasons, reasons not to deliberate in some ways on some
reasons, and perhaps also Razian exclusionary reasons (on this
terminology, then, protected reasons are a particular instance of 
quasi-protected reasons). And there may be other kinds of quasi-
protected reasons as well.253 
Both my and Enoch’s accounts share the feature that a
norm changes a subject’s deliberation by merit of its
authoritative exclusionary power but without necessarily
adding a clearly stated (protected) reason into the pile of 
unexcluded reasons.254 
Raz has a second potential objection, one that applies
only to duplication problems. He might argue that the only
way that the norms I have described here can perform this
service is if they have limited scope, but that leaves the
challenge that moral norms of unlimited scope will fail to
provide the service. I concede that none of the norms that I 
have discussed thus far meet this condition, and were we to
eliminate this aspect, it would be a great challenge to explain
how the norm might exclude any reasons at all. Importantly,
however, soft law scholars have affixed the soft law label to
253. David Enoch, Authority and Reason-Giving, 86 PHIL. & 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1, 26 (2012) [hereinafter Enoch, Authority].
254. There might be other reasons-based accounts that can arrive at the same
outcome and have greater explanatory power but depart from Raz’s account.
Indeed, there might be other such accounts of constraint under hard norms. One 
promising candidate is a weight-shifting model. See Donald H. Regan, Authority
and Value: Reflections on Raz’s Morality of Freedom, 62 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 995,
1053 (1989); Donald H. Regan, Reasons, Authority and the Meaning of “Obey”:
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moral norms of limited scope. But even if we wish to face the
Razian challenge directly, it is somewhat difficult to identify
a plausible law that would fit this description, one that
encompasses the entirety of existence at all times and in all 
contexts. Perhaps a law stating simply, “be moral,” might fit.
And such a law might be as unlikely to as exclude reasons as
it is unlikely to be enacted by a legislature. Of course, if Raz’s
brand of exclusive legal positivism is to be limited to such 
bizarre legal norms, its relevance has been cut down 
significantly, and it can hardly be said to apply to the class of 
“moral standards” as Raz purports.255 But we ought not to
accept this objection so easily. Wil Waluchow and others
argue that “[t]he set of all moral reasons is not identical with 
the set of dependent [i.e., underlying] reasons under 
dispute,”256 providing support for the notion that adjudication 
invariably limits scope through application.257 
Turning to Shapiro, some of his writings indicate that
law must be the sort of thing that forecloses deliberation
regarding the action regulated. The function I describe leaves
further deliberation, so Shapiro might conclude that it does 
not threaten his approach. Like plans, he argues, law takes
prior decisions about the manner in which to achieve a goal, 
255. RAZ, AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 93, at 202.
 256. See G.J. Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General 
Jurisprudence, in  LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE COMMON
LAW WORLD 373 (2011).
257. Moreover, for Raz’s objection to be damning to soft law, alone, it must be
the case that a hard legal norm of similarly unlimited scope would be capable of
satisfying the demands of law’s essential service. This, too, is no easy task. I
suppose that we could imagine, for example, a law stating, “all those subject to
law must exist.” This norm is arguably of unlimited scope, as it applies in all
contexts in which we could possibly follow it. The problem, of course, is that it is
hard to imagine how this law could possibly make one more likely to act how they
ought to on the balance of all reasons under the Razian model. We might be
tempted to interpret such a law to be a prohibition on suicide. But even then the
law would have a scope limitation, applying only to situations in which we have
the capacity to commit suicide, just as the moral speed law applied only in
situations in which we had the capacity to drive at an unreasonable rate. The
point here is that expanding the scope of a law in this way diminishes its capacity
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as well as the goal, itself, as settled.258 In the same way that 
“our plans must be fairly stable, which is to say that they
must be reasonably resistant to reconsideration,”259 thus 
“[l]aws guide conduct in the same way . . . namely, by cutting
off deliberation and directing the subject to act in accordance
with the plan.”260 One caveat to deliberation foreclosure in
Shapiro’s account is the fact that law may be defeasible.261 
Shapiro states:
That the law is supposed to settle, and purports to settle, normative
questions should not be taken to mean that the law demands that
its dictates be followed come what may. . . . When compelling 
reasons exist, the law will normally permit its subjects to
reconsider its direction and engage in deliberation in the merits.
The catch here is that the law claims the right to determine the
conditions of its own defeasibility. It attempts to settle when the
quandaries it has resolved become unsettled.262 
It would seem, then, that legal norms “settle” normative
matters by improving or sparing deliberation even if they 
permit remaining deliberation, so long as the terms of that 
remaining deliberation are set by the laws. My example
satisfies this standard, as it performs the deliberation
alteration that plans and laws are supposed to, and any
remaining deliberation is framed by the soft law’s own
narrowing of the parameters for that deliberation to
problems regarding timing.263 
258. Although Shapiro agrees that law is defeasible for compelling reasons, this
does not mean that he does not believe in the foreclosure model because he 
explains that law “claims the right to determine the conditions of its own
defeasibility.” SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 202.
 259. Id. at 124.
 260. Id. at 274.
 261. Id. at 202.
 262. Id. 
263. Jeremy Waldron raises a similar point. See Waldron, supra note 189, at 
896 (“[A reasonableness speed limit] settles that dispute: in effect, it directs the
use of moral judgment in circumstances where it might not otherwise be engaged.
If it is a plan, it is a plan for moral thinking—because that, as much as behavior
of various kinds, is one of the things we need to plan for. Left to themselves some
people will reflect on what a reasonable speed is given the condition and width of 
the road, and others will not. This is too risky; so the plan is that everyone must 
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As such, I offer that obligatory scope adjustment is one 
function that soft norms might perform in cases of 
Supercompliance. While it would be sufficient to provide one 
psychological mechanism that performs law’s service, I would
like to discuss two other mechanisms that, while more
difficult to defend, might perform the service as well. To do 
so, I will need to refer to the other behavioral experiments
discussed.  
B. Soft Norms Can Serve As Authoritative Reminders of 
Previous Obligations 
In the Ten Commandments and Honor Code studies, the
experimenters were primarily interested in whether one’s
favorable self-image operates as a defeasible limit on their
desire to cheat. Though they did not set out to the connection
between the formal features of norms or norm creators and 
behavior, they did test norms that have different
characteristics as a means to increase the salience of moral 
commitments.264 For this reason, they called their treatments 
“moral reminders.” Despite our different focus here, we can
follow the experimenters’ lead and highlight an unsung
function that norms might perform: they can alleviate or 
remedy the deliberative infirmity of forgetfulness.
Assume that a person reaches the conclusion that a
certain action is the right action to perform on the balance of
all reasons when certain circumstances obtain. Further 
assume that this person has the unfortunate trait of
forgetting these insights regarding proper behavior unless he 
or she is exposed to particular kinds of normative prompts.
Without these prompts, this person must engage in
deliberation to determine the action mandated on the
balance of reasons. Unfortunately, this work is unwelcome 
and usually flawed, often leading the person to an improper
comply with or play their part in this plan, drivers are going to have to address
themselves to this issue of reasonableness. The example shows that even when
moral predicates are used, their use does not always beg the moral question that
the law is supposed to settle. And so we are back with the general response to
Shapiro’s first argument: a moral criterion for identifying law or for identifying
what a given law requires does not necessarily defeat the purpose of having a law
in the first place.”).
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balance and a poor decision. When exposed to these prompts, 
however, the person snaps right back into their prior
commitments, sparing themselves laborious and fallible
deliberation.  
To put this in a reasons-based framework, the norm
serves as a resurrecting reason—it resurrects the
deliberative service that prior internalized obligations were
supposed to have provided. Thus, the process operates in the
exact same way that exclusionary and protected reasons
were supposed to have worked the first time around, but it 
relies upon a soft norm to import that prior deliberative work
into the current situation, which results in constraint.  
There are a few exclusive positivist objections to the
notion that the reminder function can perform the service
necessary to earn legal status. First, there is the “you’re
doing it wrong” objection. They will argue that the norm 
serves to do nothing more than duplicate the obligations to
which the person already was subject and, therefore, the only 
instance in which such a norm can perform a deliberative
service is when the person made the error of forgetting about
a previous obligation. Since this rests on a background of 
erroneous obedience, it should not count, they might claim.
This argument is unavailable, however. Recall that both
Shapiro and Raz rely upon some sort of deliberative infirmity
when they justify obedience to law.265 Importantly, they do 
not place limits on the kinds of infirmities that count and do
not count, and were they to try, it would be difficult to draw
that line without engaging in evaluation that would rob
positivism of its claim to being a descriptive exercise.
Another objection is that legality requires that the norm
must, itself, be obligatory and not simply something that
refers to prior obligations.
The impact on deliberation that I describe is largely to
inform the subject of a normative commitment that already
existed and of which the subject would not otherwise have 
been aware. Even if we assume that such a norm has been 
given by a source imbued with conventionally understood 
Hartian legal authority, there remains the question of
whether the reminding function is enough to satisfy the
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demands of Razian legality. Here I depart from Enoch, who 
would doubt that it succeeds because the function that I 
describe resembles the one that his “purely epistemic
reasons” provide.266 
When a norm provides “purely epistemic reasons” to the
deliberator, the existence of the norm serves not to create a
new reason to act but merely to provide information that will
allow him or her to make a better decision.267 For example,
suppose that a jilted lover wants to key his former lover’s car, 
and he asks a friend to give him a reason not to do it. The
friend might identify that there is a security camera pointing
at the car. Since the security camera was in that position the 
whole time, it was always a reason not to key the car even 
though the jilted lover was not always aware of it. When the
friend made the jilted lover aware of the camera, she
performed an epistemic service, providing information but
not a new reason to act. Compare this to a situation in which 
someone promises to return a borrowed sweater. The act of
promising creates a new, independent reason to return the 
sweater for the borrower. Before the promise was made, that
particular reason did not exist (even if other reasons favored 
returning the sweater). 
According to Enoch, purely epistemic reasons do not 
satisfy the requirements of authority under the Razian
account of legality, which he believes requires protected, as 
described in the previous Part, or quasi-protected reasons.
Importantly, however, Enoch concedes that “there can be an
epistemic phenomenon that is close enough to that of
authority, and that includes preemption (perhaps some 
special cases of expertise are of this kind).”268 
Before continuing, it is appropriate to take a momentary 
step back and remind the reader that it is doubtful that soft 
law skepticism would turn on such a technical philosophical 
point. But insofar as we have the goal of asking whether this 
phenomenon satisfies the very detailed reasons framework
266. David Enoch, Reason-Giving and the Law, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4 (2011) [hereinafter Enoch, Reason-Giving].
 267. David Enoch, Giving Practical Reasons, 11 PHILOSOPHERS’ IMPRINT 1, 4 
(2011).









































    
   
 
 869 2014] NORM SUPERCOMPLIANCE
that Raz has used to justify exclusive legal positivism, then
it is important to address the point.
As mentioned in the previous Part, Raz is not beholden
to a reason-giving model of authority. Further, despite
Enoch’s doubts that a purely epistemic function can be 
authoritative in the Razian sense, he does not deny that it
269can meet the test for legality.  Moreover, Enoch famously
argued that there is no reason, even among officials, to accept 
that the law provides a robust new reason to do the act
prescribed by the law in every instance that a law is made;270 
in many cases a law’s primary function is merely to trigger a
conditional legal reason that was there all along, and that is
not a problem for a generally positivistic theory at all.271 For 
example, a law that introduces a punishment of incarceration
for fraud might trigger the application of the preexisting
norm that one should not perform acts that could lead to 
imprisonment even if it does not provide a new robust reason 
not to commit fraud due to the fact that the punishment has
legal status.
The question remains, however, whether there is some
material difference between the experience of authoritative
reminding and the experience of legality that Raz and
Shapiro describe. Perhaps there is. When a subject is given 
an authoritative reminder through a norm, the subject does
269. Enoch, Reason-Giving, supra note 266, at 27 n.43 (“And it seems to me clear
that the law sometimes gives reasons in this epistemic sense–indicating that I
have a reason, the existence of which does not depend on the law so indicating.
But I don’t think that the law’s power to give reason in this epistemic way is either
central or problematic, and so in the text I ignore it.”).
 270. Id. at 20 (“I am spending some time on the motivations for the claim that
law necessarily gives reasons for actions, because the most striking thing about
this thesis, it seems to me, is that it is so clearly false. Obviously, sometimes when
the law requires that you , it thereby succeeds in giving you a reason to  (and
in the next section I discuss the implications of this obvious fact). But just as
obviously, sometimes this is not the case–think about exceptionally stupid or 
corrupt laws, perhaps in exceptionally stupid or corrupt legal systems.
Remember, we are now dealing with a thesis about what is necessarily true of
law, presumably as a matter of conceptual necessity. But then all that has to be
shown to establish the falsehood of the suggested reading of the claim about the
normativity of law is one conceptually possible case where the law–any law–
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not necessarily perceive that that the reminding norm
demands compliance with its own content. From a functional 
standpoint, any failure to comply with the reminding norm is
ultimately a failure to comply with the preexisting norm. As 
a consequence, it is at least possible that the subject will not
perceive the reminding norm as something that, itself, needs 
to be complied with. An example will help. When I ignore my 
alarm clock, I do not perceive myself as transgressing the 
command to wake up that has been announced by my clock. 
Rather, I perceive myself as transgressing the command to 
teach my 9:00 a.m. class, for which I set my alarm in the first
place. 
As this example shows, at least part of the problem is
that there is no limit to what can serve the epistemic function
that I describe.272 Anything can serve as a reminder, even an
inanimate object. Thus, this account, without some further 
limit, does not comport with our phenomenology of legality. 
One limitation is the manner in which an authoritative
reminder is given. An important difference between the
reminding function during an act of Supercompliance and the
provision of a purely epistemic reason is that the former 
always comes in the form of a norm. While the primary
function of the norm is effectively to piggyback upon the
function of a preexisting hard norm, it is not necessarily the
case that the soft norm is entirely normatively inert. The fact 
that comes from a norm-giver—a human being or group—
makes it phenomenologically dissimilar to an experience 
with an inanimate object. I can think of no reason that a soft 
norm issued by a person or group that serves this reminding
function cannot be treated in an obligatory fashion. The 
forgetful subject may treat consultation of that norm as an
obligation even if the norm’s primary function is recollection
rather than to provide a first-order reason to do that which is
stated in the norm. He or she may do so by internalizing the
belief that he or she is obligated to consult the reminder and 
consider its content, just as people typically do under hard 
norms. 
Let us consider the ostensibly empty directive, “take one
day at a time.” It commonly serves as a useful authoritative
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reminder to members of Alcoholics Anonymous (“A.A.”) that
they are not to drink alcohol on that day. This is despite the 
fact that they have already committed themselves to a life of
sobriety by merit of their membership to the organization 
and that the norm might be, on a literal reading, impossible
to violate (how can one take two days at a time?). Were that
slogan to be uttered by a person or group other than A.A., one 
that is not perceived to be authoritative, the A.A. member
might disregard it and end up drinking as a result. Further, 
it is entirely possible that when an A.A. member drinks, he
or she believes that not only has he or she violated the
original norm to stay sober but also the norm to “take one day 
at a time.” 
Thus, the fact that the source of the reminding norm is 
taken as an authority can be a necessary component of its 
making a practical difference to deliberation. And as with
any Razian authority, the norm-giver can earn that authority
by serving as a consistently helpful reminder of the right
balance of reasons over time.273 From the perspective of the
actor, there is little difference between the triggering
function that law often provides and the authoritative
reminder function that I just described. In both, the trigger
or the reminder cause the actor to consider a preexisting
norm that applies to the situation at hand, causing a
practical difference to deliberation that is content-dependent. 
It does not appear that the difference in this function
necessarily results in a different experience for the actor.
Whether there is an important metaphysical difference can
be debated, but Raz and Shapiro’s account of legality is
primarily functional and phenomenological rather than
metaphysical. 
Once reminding occurs under an authoritative norm,
whether that norm is hard or soft, there is always a risk that 
the subject will nevertheless choose to disregard a prior 
commitment, stalling the service that law might have
provided. There is empirical support of the notion that soft 
norms might actually outperform hard norms in this regard. 
Not only did we observe this in the tabloid experiment, but
my own research reached a similar result, providing support
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for the notion that soft aspirational norms were more likely 
to keep intrinsic charitable motivations intact than were
mandatory norms.274 This phenomenon has been observed in
numerous psychological experiments concerning whether 
incentives “crowd out” intrinsic charitable motives,275 but my
research identified a parallel phenomenon in which 
mandatory (hard) operators initiated the crowding out effect 
but aspirational (soft) operators did not.276 
C. Soft Norms Can Set Into Motion a Process of Useful Self-
Deception When Consciously Perceived as Obligations 
Recalling the Laura example, she interpreted her 
parents’ soft directive as if it were a hard directive that
prohibited her from watching television, something that she
believed that she wanted to do.277 Though Laura was faced 
with a norm that provided ample opportunities for non-
obligatory interpretation, she concluded that the correct 
interpretation was one that obligated her to forego television.
Were this norm absent, Laura would have watched television
as she ordinarily did. It is, of course, possible that foregoing
television was the right conduct in which to engage on the
balance of all reasons. If so, then the presence of the norm
performed a valuable service for her.
Given that the norm to which she was subject was so
open-ended, it appears that she was free to choose an
interpretation that allowed her to indulge in a conscious 
desire to watch television. Yet, she reasoned that she could 
not do that, perhaps subconsciously choosing to indulge a
temptation to be bound by a norm. Rather than
acknowledging that she had this choice, Laura felt as though
the choice was inevitable on an honest appraisal of the
circumstances and the content of the norm.
274. See Brian Sheppard & Fiery Cushman, Evaluating Norms: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Relationship between Norm-Content, Operator, and Charitable
Behavior, 63 VAND. L. REV. 55, 80 (2010).
 275. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN
BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 245-46 (1971).
 276. See Sheppard & Cushman, supra note 274, at 80. 
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Those who feel that, as an objective matter, Laura could
permissibly have chosen to pursue her conscious desire to
watch television might say that Laura has engaged in an act 
of self-deception so that she may avoid acknowledging that
she has engaged in masochistic behavior. Critically, however,
she would not have succeeded in the act of self-deception
were it not for the presence of the soft norm to initiate and 
support the process.
Similar traits have been the object of study in clinical
psychology for some time. The popular usage of the term 
“masochism” refers to a distinct and strong sexual desire 
characterized by the preference for self-suffering or
sacrifice.278 Masochism need not be based on sexual pleasure 
seeking, however. Indeed, the American Psychological 
Association included Masochistic279 Personality Disorder 
(“MPD”) in the DSM-III-R Appendix as a proposed diagnostic 
category, in part, because it believed that psychologists had
discovered a psychopathology that shared the basic
principles of sexual masochism but that occurred in non-
sexual contexts.280 Since sexual masochism already had its 
own entry in the DSM at that time, some psychologists 
believed that MPD ought to as well.281 
MPD, also known as “Self-Defeating Personality,” is 
marked, in part, by engagement in a pattern of avoiding or 
undermining pleasurable experiences and being drawn to
situations or relationships in which the actor will suffer.282 
For instance, the very first criterion listed in the DSM for
MPD was that a person “[c]hooses . . . situations that lead to
his or her disappointment, failure or mistreatment even
278. MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1093 (9th ed. 2013).
279. In the DSM-III-R it was given an alternate name, “Self-Defeating 
Personality Disorder,” but the index refers to the phenomenon as “Masochistic
Personality Disorder” as well, and many psychologists continue to refer to it with
that label. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS Appendix A (3d ed. Revised 1987). 
280. See id. (“The behaviors . . . do not occur only in response to, or in
anticipation of, being physically, sexually or psychologically abused.”).
 281. Daniel Goleman, New Psychiatric Syndromes Spur Protest, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 19, 1985, at C1.
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when better options are clearly available to him or her,”283 
often insisting that this is the best or an inevitable course of 
action. The parallel to Laura is obvious. The same can be said
for another listed criterion—that those with MPD “[e]ngage[]
in excessive self-sacrifice that is unsolicited by the intended 
recipients of the sacrifice.”284 Laura’s parents never expected
Laura to sacrifice television entirely, and, more importantly,
there were straightforward interpretations of the norm that 
would have permitted television watching. The fact that the 
behaviors underlying sexual masochism and Masochistic 
Personality Disorder actually exist goes some way towards 
supporting the notion that Norm Supercompliance is 
plausible.  
The important point is that there is no categorical reason
to assume that engaging in this sort of behavior will always
cause one to make decisions that are worse than if he or she 
had not been exposed to the norm at all. Thus, the influence
of masochistic thinking on this deliberation leaves open the
door for the possibility that soft norms are the sort of thing
that are capable of benefitting people, consistent with law’s
claims. 
Still, some might say that Laura’s approach and others 
like it ascribe an intrinsic power to a norm that is not really
there. The constraining power really comes from an 
exogenous source—the subject’s subconscious
misinterpretation of that norm. The problem with this
reasoning is the baggage that comes from accusations of
misinterpretation. It is premised on the notion that a
straightforward interpretation of the norm is always the
correct interpretation of the norm, so an interpretation that
leads one to constrain him or herself under the norm is either
mistaken or self-deceptive. Positivists risk inconsistency
when they raise such arguments, however, because they
otherwise assert that there is no single, valid way to
adjudicate laws. Himma explains, “[p]roperly understood,
positivism does not entail any particular theory of
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a purely conventional rules about how officials should
behave, then it will be up to any given society to decide what
duties judges have in deciding hard cases.” 285 Indeed, the only 
limitation on adjudication advanced by Shapiro is purposive, 
as he states, “[a]n interpretive methodology is proper for an 
interpreter in a given legal system just in case it best furthers 
the objectives actors are entrusted with advancing. . . .”286 
Thus, a legal system may conclude that non-straightforward 
interpretations, even ones that are “self-defeating,” are
proper if they are suitably useful under the objectives set by
the legal system.287 Positivists are famously agnostic about 
the particular goals that any particular legal system ought to 
advance, and Raz and Shapiro set only the requirement that
law claims to make those who follow it morally better off than
they were without it. There is no reason to assume that a
masochistic interpretation of a soft norm is incapable of
satisfying this modest criterion. 
Another objection might be that this function makes the 
authority of the law superfluous. This is a valid point: there 
is no reason that someone cannot engage in useful 
masochism under norms that are not meant to be
authoritative by the norm-giver—this is a rather one-sided 
account of obedience.288 Even so, it is not necessary for these
285. Kenneth Einar Himma, Substance and Method in Conceptual 
Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 88 VA. L. REV. 1119, 1207 n.235 (2002)
(reviewing COLEMAN, PRACTICE, supra note 78).
 286. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 103, at 359.
287. Raz might be tempted to raise a different argument. He would describe this
scenario as a “directed power”—an instance in which the legislators have used 
open-ended standards to delegate power to the law-applying organ in order to
exact a change in the law through further legislation. See RAZ, ETHICS, supra note
117, at 242. The judges are “directed” to make these changes by engaging in moral
deliberation about how best to serve the goals the law seeks to serve. Raz might
argue that these self-defeating judges are not satisfying their duty to adjudicate
on their best balancing of all reasons. But, if that argument were raised, it would
ignore that these judges do not realize that they are not engaging in a true 
subjective balancing of all reasons, as well as the fact that they might end up
reaching the true objective balancing of all reasons despite their self-defeating
subconscious impulses.
288. To return to Enoch’s typology of reasons, it is possible that the norm in this
instance performs a triggering role, changing the circumstances such that a 

































   
 
   
   
 
876 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
functions to require harmony between norm-giver and norm-
follower; it is enough that they perform a function that
satisfies the Raz/Shapiro service conception of legality. Here, 
the subject perceives the norm to be obligatory, and this
perception sets into motion a process that makes a practical 
and potentially beneficial difference to his or her
deliberation. 
Any such debate about the proper purpose of
adjudication or interpretation in this context would end up
perilously close to the one that doomed MPD as a diagnostic
label. When MPD was provisionally included in the DSM,
many psychologists complained that its inclusion risked 
psychologizing the experience of abused women, in effect
blaming them for traits that are the result of oppressive 
cultural norms and violent male behavior.289 
Moreover, some critics believed that MPD’s diagnostic 
criteria imposed an unduly narrow view of normality: 
They constitute an ad hoc collection of behaviors that do not 
conform with late-20th-century notions of how to relate to others to
maximize one’s self interest. Apparently, to the proponents of the
MPD diagnosis, it appeared self-evidently pathological for people to
underachieve, to not use others for their own benefit, to feel or be 
defeated, or to put the interests of others above their own: in a 
culture that places high value on pleasure, short-term gain, and 
using other people, the behavior of many women seemed 
inexplicable.290 
In short, they argued that characterizing the collective
traits described as a disorder imposed a negative gloss on
behavior that might be normal, perhaps even salutary. Take 
the notion that the sacrifice involved in constraint under a
process described in the preceding Part apply here as well. One distinction here,
however, is that this function does not require the existence of a preexisting norm,
so it might provide a reason-giving function as well. It does not always provide
robust reasons as Enoch understands them because it does not necessarily involve
a situation in which A intends to give B a reason to do a particular action and A
communicates this intention to B. See Enoch, Reason-Giving, supra note 266, at
13.
 289. See HERB KUTCHINS & STUART A. KIRK, MAKING US CRAZY: DSM: THE
PSYCHIATRIC BIBLE AND THE CREATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS 126-43 (1997).
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soft norm is “excessive.” One person’s excessive self-sacrifice 
is another person’s altruism, charity, or pro-social 
behavior.291 For this reason, it is important to be clear that 
my use of the term “masochistic” to describe the behavior is
meant to be value neutral.
This MPD debate is important to this project because it 
makes vivid an important pitfall that must be avoided in the
analysis of Norm Supercompliance. The major problems 
associated with the inclusion of Masochistic Personality in
the DSM were the result of the desire to label it a disorder or
otherwise incorrect. We should not make the same mistake
in this context by taking too narrow a view of the sorts of
functions that count and do not count. The most important
thing from a functional point of view is that the norms have 
the capacity to set into motion a potentially helpful change in
a deliberation when they are perceived to be obligatory. 
CONCLUSION 
I hope that I have established that Norm 
Supercompliance is a vehicle through which soft law can 
manifest its power to provide the very sorts of benefits that 
scholars expect hard law to provide. If so, then the dominant,
functionalist justification for stripping soft law of legal status
ought to be revised or abandoned.292 
Though theorists have relied on folk wisdom regarding
the kinds of norms that make sense for solving the problems 
that law seeks to solve, empirical study has shown that the 
relationship between norm and interpreter is more complex 
291. See DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN ETHICAL THEORY 142
(1982).
292. My empirical examination was meant to show that the functionalist
foundation for soft law skepticism and exclusive positivism is based on false
claims about behavior. The argument does not, of course, rescue soft law from all
attacks. If it is true, for example, that a social rule is not a necessary condition
for law’s service to be performed, then that does not mean that we cannot continue
to hold that a social rule is a necessary condition for legality, thereby pushing a
class of soft norms out. Indeed, if we are willing to use some other foundation for
legality, such as how we ordinarily use the term “law” in our linguistic practices,
then it might make sense to make a Hartian social rule a necessary element of
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than they have anticipated. Tony Honoré once said, “Decade
after decade, [p]ositivists and [n]atural [l]awyers face one 
another in the final of the World Cup (the [s]ociologists have 
never learned the rules).”293 The onus is not merely on
sociologists to study legal theory; it is also on legal theorists
to study sociology and psychology. It should come as no 
surprise that the vast majority of the discussions regarding
legal constraint are conceptual in nature and seldom rely on 
scientific methodologies or the results therefrom. There are 
good reasons for this: conceptual theories tend to be 
byproducts of deductive reasoning, and armchair logical
techniques are ordinarily adequate to show that a theory is
invalid without being costly. And even when the soundness
of a theory is questioned, theorists are skilled at conjuring
plausible counterexamples without availing themselves to
the methods of science. Once we consult the scientific 
literature, however, we are unable to ignore that those who
believe they are subject to law’s authority can bind
themselves in surprising ways. Subjects have unanticipated 
weaknesses that soft norms can remedy, perhaps even more 
effectively than hard norms. 
It will surely be tempting for skeptics and exclusive
positivists to deny the empirical character of their positions
and, thereby, try to negate any notion that the evidence I
have presented will unseat them. They might concede that
Supercompliance occurs but dismiss it on the ground that
Supercompliers are, as a conceptual matter, failing to obey in
the right way. They might argue that soft laws provide 
assistance only when Supercompliers suffer from some sort 
of serious infirmity such as habitual forgetfulness. Or they
might say that Supercompliers misinterpret the norms 
before them, bypassing their proper, straightforward 
readings. I do not find these arguments persuasive because 
the functionalist view of law cannot and should not be sealed
off from empirical evidence of function, because their 
functionalism assumes, rather than denies, that people
suffer from infirmities that laws can remedy, and because
positivists cannot endorse so narrow an interpretive view 
293. A.M. Honoré, Groups, Laws and Obedience, in  OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
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without violating the underlying principles of descriptive 
neutrality that they hold so dear.
This leaves a milder justification for denying soft law’s
legal status—namely, the relatively low probability that soft
law will provide law’s service. I concede that I did not explore
probabilities in this Article. Even if we were inclined to probe
that issue, however, the jury is still out as to the more basic
question of whether and in what context hard law
outperforms soft law as a constraint. Likewise, there needs 
to be more research into the possibility that certain features
of softness are more or less likely to satisfy the demands of a 
service-based conception of legality. Nevertheless, drawing
the line between law and non-law at some level of probability
that beneficial constraint will occur comes with too great a
risk of arbitrariness. How likely does constraint need to be
for something to be legal? 
For those convinced by Norm Supercompliance that soft 
law passes the functionalist test for legality, a different 
question might arise: should we dispense with the hard/soft 
distinction altogether? I think not. Soft and hard law are not 
functional equivalents. Scholars have already recognized 
that the two kinds of law differ as to legislative cost, 
delegation of authority, and executive involvement. And with
regard to constraining power, we ought to consider the 
possibility that soft norms could be better constraints than 
hard norms when the goal is to insulate subjects from 
crowding out effects and leave their intrinsic altruistic 
motivations intact.294 This is yet another question that 
empirical research ought to investigate further. 
I focused here on an unduly ignored category of
constraint under norms. In doing so, I tried to unmask the 
narrowness with which we have approached the relationship 
between norm and subject. We can do much more to inform 
legislators about how to build better norms. If such a project 
is to succeed, however, all of the parties involved must keep
an open mind about the kinds of behaviors that can result
from exposure to norms and the various shapes that our norm 
sources, sanctions, operators, and content can take.
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